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Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law:
The Failure of Revised U.C.C. § 1-301 and a
Proposal for Broader Reform
Jack M. Graves ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2001, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)
completed their revision of Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (“U.C.C” or “Code”) and promulgated this newly revised
uniform version for adoption by the states. To date, only the
Territory of the Virgin Islands has adopted the new uniform version
1
of Article 1 in its entirety.
Twenty-one state legislatures have
introduced bills containing revised Article 1; however, none have
adopted the new expanded choice-of-law provisions contained in
2
3
4
5
revised section 1-301. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
6
7
8
9
10
11
Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
∗
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Law at Stetson University College of Law, for their helpful comments on various
drafts of this Article. The views advanced herein are the Author’s alone.
1
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 11A, § 1-301 (2003). Much of the information regarding
introduction and adoption of legislation involving revised Article 1 was obtained
from the NCCUSL website. NCCUSL, Final Acts & Legislation, http://www.nccusl.
org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=60 (select “UCC Article 1,
General Provisions” from “Select an Act Title” drop-down menu; select desired state
or territory from “Select a State” drop-down menu) (last visited Oct. 3, 2005);
NCCUSL, A Few Facts About the Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 1,
General Provisions (2001), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-ucc1.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
2
ALA. CODE § 7-1-301 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
3
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-301 (Supp. 2005).
4
2005 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 5-109 (adopting revisions to Article 1 of the U.C.C.
to “conform Connecticut commercial law with recent changes in the uniform law”).
5
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (1999 & Supp. 2005).
6
HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:1-301 (Supp. 2004).
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Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia all adopted the
16
majority of the revisions, but each retained the approach of former
section 1-105 in lieu of revised section 1-301. The legislatures of
17
18
19
20
21
Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
22
23
North Dakota, and West Virginia also introduced bills containing
revised Article 1. However, all except those in Illinois, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire died without adoption, and only the New
24
Hampshire bill retains the uniform revised section 1-301.
One of the primary controversies surrounding revised Article 1
centers on section 1-301 and its greater deference to party autonomy
25
to choose applicable law in non-consumer transactions.
Simply
stated, party autonomy measures the extent to which contracting
parties may choose the substantive law to be applied by a tribunal
charged with deciding the parties’ rights and duties under the
26
contract and resolving disputes between the parties.
Former section 1-105 limited party autonomy by limiting the
parties’ choice to the law of a state or nation to which their
7

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-1-301 (Supp. 2004).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-301 (West Supp. 2005).
9
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-301 (2005).
10
Legis. B. 570, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005) (enacted) (to be codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. (U.C.C.) § 1-301).
11
S. 201, 73d Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005) (enacted).
12
N.M. STAT. § 55-1-301 (Supp. 2005).
13
H.R. 2028, 50th Legis. Sess., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2005) (enacted) (to be codified at
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 1-301).
14
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301 (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005).
15
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-301 (Supp. 2005).
16
Aside from section 1-301, the only other provision that has not been uniformly
adopted is revised section 1-201(20), which would broaden the definition of good
faith under Article 1 to include “observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing” in all transactions within its scope. See Keith A. Rowley, One For All, But
None For (All of) One: Revised Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Part 2 of 2), 12
NEV. LAW., Aug. 2004, at 28, 29 & n.27.
17
S. 1234, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005).
18
S. 1647, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2005).
19
H.R. 2453, 81st Leg. (Kan. 2005).
20
H.R. 91, 183d Gen. Court (Mass. 2003).
21
H.R. 719, 159th Gen. Court (N.H. 2005).
22
S. 2143, 59th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2005).
23
S. 254, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 2004).
24
See Keith A. Rowley, The Often Imitated, But Not Yet Duplicated, Revised Uniform
Commercial Code Article 1, 9–12 (2005), http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rowley/RA1.
070105.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). The New Hampshire bill also appears likely to
die without enactment. Id. at 12.
25
See id. at 5–6, 11–12.
26
See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.1 (4th ed. 2004).
8
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27

transaction bore a reasonable relationship.
In contrast, revised
section 1-301 would allow commercial parties to choose the law of any
28
state (or, in an international transaction, any state or nation),
subject to a narrow exception where the parties’ choice would
contravene a fundamental policy of the jurisdiction whose law would
29
otherwise apply. Supporters have urged states to follow the lead of
the ALI and NCCUSL and adopt the revised uniform provisions of
30
section 1-301.
However, these new provisions have generated
31
substantial opposition from two very different perspectives.
On one hand, some scholars have argued against section 1-301’s
greater deference to the parties’ express choice of governing law for
fear of mischief in the selection of the laws of a state to which the
32
transaction bears no relationship. These opponents of expanded
party autonomy suggest that, if the parties are granted complete
autonomy, they may abuse it to deprive a state of its sovereign power
33
to legislate for the benefit and protection of its citizenry. A choiceof-law rule allowing for such a private attack on state sovereignty
would be contrary to the rule of law and would, therefore, fail to pass
34
constitutional muster under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. While
consumer transactions are expressly excluded from the rules
expanding party autonomy, opponents of such autonomy have
nevertheless expressed concerns over unequal bargaining power in
35
many transactions that do not involve consumers.
On the other hand, many industry groups have opposed section
1-301 because of its special deference to consumers and individual
state laws designed to protect them—favoring, instead, broad party

27

See U.C.C. § 1-105 (superseded 2001).
See id. § 1-301(c) (2001).
29
See id. § 1-301(f) (2001).
30
Cf. generally Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Chair, Unif. Commercial
Code Article 1 Drafting Comm., to Members of the Am. Law Inst. (May 10, 2001),
http://www.ali.org/ali/2001_Reporters_M3.htm.
31
See sources cited infra notes 32–36.
32
See generally, e.g., William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative
Choice in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697 (2001); Richard K. Greenstein,
Is the Proposed U.C.C. Choice of Law Provision Unconstitutional?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1159
(2001).
33
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 701.
34
See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1181–83.
35
See Pamela Edwards, Into the Abyss: How Party Autonomy Supports Overreaching
Through the Exercise of Unequal Bargaining Power, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 421, 455
(2003); see also generally Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of
Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295 (2005).
28
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autonomy to choose controlling law in all transactions, including
36
those involving consumers.
Presumably, each of these sources of opposition has influenced
the actions of the state legislatures that have considered section 1-301
to date. Thus far, no state has adopted either the expanded
approach to party autonomy or the special deference to consumer
protection laws reflected in the model law. At this stage of the efforts
to enact revised Article 1 as a whole, section 1-301 and its attempt to
expand party autonomy to choose applicable law in non-consumer
37
transactions must be deemed a rather dismal failure.
With the likely demise of section 1-301 as a source of uniform
law, it seems timely to revisit some of the issues raised in the debate
over its enactment and consider possible alternatives for addressing
the question of party autonomy in choice-of-law governing contracts
38
between commercial parties other than consumers.
In doing so,
36

See Letter from Daniel J. Popeo, Chairman and Gen. Counsel, and David A.
Price, Senior Vice President, Legal Affairs, Wash. Legal Found., to K. King Burnett,
President, Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, and Michael Traynor,
President, Am. Law Inst. (May 9, 2003), http://www.ali.org/ali/WLFUCCcomments.
pdf; Letter from Quentin Riegel, Vice President, Litig. & Deputy Gen. Counsel, Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs., to Josephine Scarlett, Nat’l Telecomms. and Info. Admin. (Dec. 24,
2002), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/frnotices/2002/esign/ucc/comments/
nam/nam.htm; National Association of Manufacturers, Industry Concerns About
Final Article 2 Revisions, http://www.nam.org/s_nam/doc1.asp?CID=200173&DID=
223242 (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
Inasmuch as this Article does not address consumer transactions, it does not
expressly take any position with respect to the positions of these opponents of revised
section 1-301.
37
U.C.C. § 1-301 is not the first uniform statute addressing choice of law to be
rejected by state legislatures. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(“UCITA”), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm
(last visited Oct. 3, 2005), has also been rejected by every state to consider it, except
Maryland and Virginia. While the opposition to UCITA was not limited to its choice
of law provision, this was certainly a focal point. See infra note 79.
38
In this Article, I will focus solely on non-consumer transactions. Much of the
debate surrounding revised U.C.C. Article 1 and, more recently, revised U.C.C.
Article 2, involves concerns with consumer transactions. Legal reform in commercial
law is arguably much more likely to the extent that consumer and non-consumer
transactions are addressed separately. See Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to
Symposium on Proposed Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 787, 792 & n.25 (2001). An
excellent example of this separation is found in the United Nations Convention for
the International Sale of Goods under Article 2(a). United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 2(a), Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668
(1980) [hereinafter CISG] (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1988). See also UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, pmbl. cmt. 2 (2004)
[hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES] (explaining that the restriction of the
UNIDROIT Principles to commercial contracts is intended to exclude “consumer
transactions” because they are “increasingly subjected to special rules, mostly of a
mandatory character, aimed at protecting the consumer”).
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39

this Article takes a comparative approach.
This Article examines
various critiques of expanded party autonomy in light of current
realities of party autonomy in choice-of-law: (1) in arbitration, (2)
under various state choice-of-law statutes addressing certain
categories of contracts, and (3) under various foreign and
international approaches to choice-of-law. Based on the conclusions
arising out of this examination, this Article proposes a uniform
40
choice-of-law statute governing commercial contracts generally and
granting even greater party autonomy in non-consumer transactions
41
than does revised section 1-301.
This Article suggests that
commercial parties should be allowed to choose any body of law to
42
govern their transaction, subject only to minimal requirements in
43
the case of form contracts to ensure actual consent and a narrow

Thus, I discuss and attempt to address the arguments opposing the expansion of
party autonomy reflected in section 1-301. However, I will not directly address any
issues regarding choice-of-law in consumer transactions. Nor will I address issues
relating to choice-of-law in employment contracts. See PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 139, 143–50 (1999) (suggesting the need to consider
special protections when addressing choice-of-law in consumer and employment
contracts). To the extent that any of my analysis may bear on issues arising in
consumer or employment contracts, this is entirely incidental to the focus of this
Article, as the model statute proposed in Part VI would not apply to either.
39
See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need For a Comparative Approach to Choiceof-Law Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309 (1999) [hereinafter Juenger, Need For a
Comparative Approach].
40
U.C.C. § 1-301 would only apply to transactions otherwise governed by another
article of the Code, U.C.C. § 1-301(b) (2001), but not governed by a more specific
choice of law provision in that article, see id. § 1-301(g) (2001). See also id. § 1-102
(2001) (limiting the scope of Article 1 to transactions otherwise governed by the
Code).
41
While significantly expanding deference to party autonomy, section 1-301
retains significant limits on the parties’ right to choose foreign, international, or anational law. See infra Part II.C.
42
As more fully explained infra, I propose the elimination of other additional
limits contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971) (expressly limiting the parties to
“state” law, as opposed to a-national law); id. § 187(2)(a) (1971) (declining to
enforce the parties’ choice if the chosen state: (1) “has no substantial relationship to
the parties or transaction,” and (2) “there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’
choice”); id. § 187 cmt. d (1971) (limiting the parties right to choose their own law to
circumstances in which two or more states have an interest in the transaction), and
revised Article 1 of the U.C.C., see U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(1) (2001) (limiting parties to a
domestic transaction to choice of domestic state law); id. § 1-301(c)(1) and (2)
(2001) (expressly limiting the parties to the law of a “state” or “country,” as opposed
to a-national law). But see id. § 1-301 cmt. 2 (2001) (discussing the possible
application of a-national law under section 1-302).
43
See infra Part VI.B.2.
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exception where the parties’ choice would directly contravene a
44
fundamental public policy of a relevant state.
This Article’s most obvious claim is that such a statute will
increase predictability and efficiency in commercial dispute
resolution, consistent with the intentions of the parties. This Article’s
less obvious but perhaps more significant claims, in light of actual
current and likely future realities in commercial dispute resolution,
are that: (1) state sovereignty is actually better served by granting
increased party autonomy as proposed here; and (2) such a statute
would satisfy any constitutional requirements.
Part II of this Article frames the issues and explains the
importance of expanded party autonomy in choice of governing
contract law. While all or most state choice-of-law regimes will
enforce the parties’ express choice between the laws of any state or
nation to which the transaction bears a “reasonable relation,” many
will not enforce an express choice of any other body of law. Part II
then describes a variety of circumstances giving rise to sound
commercial reasons why parties might indeed wish to select a body of
law other than that of a jurisdiction to which the transaction bears a
relationship.
Part III compares the level of party autonomy in choice-of-law, as
applied in arbitration versus court proceedings in the United States.
French comparativist René David noted over thirty years ago that
parties could, and frequently did, avoid court imposed limits on party
45
autonomy in choice-of-law by simply choosing arbitration.
More
recently, the late Friedrich K. Juenger pointed out the need for a
comparative approach to choice-of-law problems, seemingly inviting
46
such a comparison. Part III also explores the differences between
treatment of the parties’ choice of governing law in arbitration and
court adjudication, and then asks whether these differences are
desirable, or whether either or both should be modified so as to
make each more consistent with the other.
44

As more fully explained infra, I suggest a fundamental public policy exception
similar to that contained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(b)
(1971), and revised section 1-301(f) of the U.C.C., and also commonly found in
international law. See infra Part VI.B.1. This Article does not intend to suggest that
such an exception to party autonomy is novel, but rather that such a narrow
exception provides the most effective means of avoiding unreasonable infringement
on state sovereignty while maximizing party choice.
45
René David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 212, Note 5802 (1973). See also Friedrich K.
Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 1133, 1133–
34 (2000) [hereinafter Juenger, Lex Mercatoria].
46
See Juenger, Need For a Comparative Approach, supra note 39, at 1332.
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Part IV compares various domestic state statutes—other than
those contained in the U.C.C.—addressing party autonomy in choice
of contract law. These include both uniform statutes addressing
narrow areas of application, as well as broad statutes, applying to
contracts generally, but limited to only one or a small number of
states. As with choice-of-law in arbitration, these statutes present
parties, in many circumstances, with an opportunity to circumvent
other state choice-of-law statutes that may place greater restrictions
on party autonomy. Part IV also evaluates the relative merits of some
of these statutes and attempts to draw from them in considering the
outlines of a model domestic choice-of-law statute for contracts.
Part V compares the level of party autonomy provided under a
sampling of foreign and international choice-of-law regimes. A survey
of numerous foreign and international provisions addressing choiceof-law in contracts shows that the apparently “controversial”
expansion of party autonomy under revised section 1-301 does not
even go as far in granting party autonomy as many current
international and foreign choice-of-law regimes. Part V explores
these differences between choice-of-law rules for contracts in our
domestic system and other legal systems, asks whether such
differences are appropriate, and then asks what guidance they might
provide in considering a model domestic choice-of-law statute for
commercial contracts.
Part VI begins by addressing the need for uniformity in
contractual choice-of-law provisions and then proposes a model
choice-of-law provision applicable to private non-consumer contracts,
generally—and not limited to those otherwise governed by the U.C.C.
Part VI concludes with a brief examination of the constitutionality of
the proposed model statute under the Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit Clauses.
II. CHOICE OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Most legal analysis focuses on the application of substantive law
to the facts of a dispute. However, a dispute is often effectively
decided by the choice of which substantive law governs the legal
relationship. Thus, in resolving a commercial dispute, the threshold
question faced by a tribunal is the choice of substantive law governing
the parties’ relationship. In the absence of an express choice by the
47
parties, the tribunal must make its own choice of appropriate law.
47

See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 188 (1971).
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When the entire transaction takes place in a single jurisdiction
in which the tribunal and each party also resides, the choice is usually
48
easy—the tribunal chooses the substantive law of that jurisdiction.
However, when the transaction bears a reasonable relationship to
more than one jurisdiction, then the tribunal may have to make a
choice between multiple, and sometimes conflicting, bodies of
substantive law. In making that choice, a tribunal engages in a
49
conflict analysis to determine the appropriate substantive law.
However, an agreement will sometimes include an express
choice-of-law provision. In that case, the tribunal faces a different
threshold question—whether to respect and enforce the parties’
50
choice.
While it is often said that American courts respect the
51
parties’ autonomy to choose their own law of contract, that
52
autonomy is, in fact, subject to significant limits.
A. Choice of Law under the Uniform Commercial Code
In domestic commercial transactions within the scope of the
U.C.C., choice-of-law was historically governed by various state law
53
enactments of former section 1-105. Section 1-105(1) provided that
the parties’ choice should be respected if, and only if, the parties
chose the law of a state to which the transaction bore a reasonable
54
relation. Thus, a Florida seller and Georgia buyer of goods could
effectively choose either Florida or Georgia law, but could not choose
the law of New York (absent some relationship to New York). A
fortiori, the parties could not choose some other body of law not
48

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
See id.
50
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2. One might reasonably argue that, “[i]n
the absence of third party effects, the parties to the transaction should be permitted
to choose the applicable law through contract,” and that such a choice by the parties
should not be limited to any particular jurisdiction or even limited to sovereign law
of any sort. Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883,
913–14 (2002). However, the parties’ interest in party autonomy may not be the only
interest considered by a court. Even in the absence of third party effects, a court may
also consider the interests of various sovereigns with an interest in the transaction, as
well as systemic interests affected by choice-of-law rules. Kathleen Patchel, Choice of
Law and Software Licenses: A Framework for Discussion, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 117, 124–32
(2000).
51
See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, §18.2; Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s
Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J.
INT’L L. 571, 576 (1999).
52
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, §18.2; Patchel, supra note 50, at 139–40 (noting
limits contained in U.C.C. § 1-105 and the Rome Convention).
53
U.C.C. § 1-105 (superseded 2001).
54
Id.
49
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adopted by any American state. Notably, the parties could include
specific stated variations from applicable law, under section
55
1-102(3), but they were not allowed to select an entire body of law
56
to replace the law of the relevant state or states.
Section 1-301 of revised Article 1 was intended to replace former
section 1-105 and expand available choices of law for non-consumer
57
commercial parties.
Section 1-301(c) provides separate rules for
domestic transactions in subsection (1) and international
58
transactions in subsection (2).
Under section 1-301, parties to a
domestic transaction may choose the law of any state—without regard
59
to whether the transaction bears any relationship to that state —and
parties to an international transaction may choose the law of any state
60
or any country. It is this expanded party autonomy in choice-of-law
that has been rejected by each of the states enacting revised Article 1
61
to date.
From its inception, section 1-301 and its proposed expansion of
party autonomy has been subject to significant criticism, as a radical
62
and ill-conceived departure from existing choice-of-law doctrine.
Scholars have argued that such broad party autonomy represents a
63
threat to state sovereignty, fails to distinguish between large and
64
small business transactions, and violates the Full Faith and Credit

55

Id. § 1-102(3) (superseded 2001).
See id. § 1-105 (superseded 2001) (limiting parties’ ability to choose applicable
law in certain areas).
57
See id. § 1-301 cmts. 1, 2 (2001).
58
Id. § 1-301(a), (c) (2001).
59
U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(1) (2001); Charles R. Keeton, Pending Revisions To The UCC
Articles 1 and 2 as They Affect E-Commerce: Is The Sky Falling?, 743 PLI/PAT. 271, 324
(2003).
60
U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(2) (2001); Keeton, supra note 59, at 324.
61
See supra Part I.
62
See, e.g., Memorandum from William J. Woodward, Jr. to Members of the Am.
Law Inst. Re: Motion to Amend Proposed U.C.C. § 1-301 (May 7, 2001), http://www.
ali.org/ali/2001Woodward_M1.htm [hereinafter Woodward Memo]; Memorandum
from Jay L. Westbrook to Members of the Am. Law Inst. Re: Motion to Table
Article 1 Proposals (May 7, 2001), http://www.ali.org/ali/2001Westerbrook_M1.htm
[hereinafter Westbrook Memo].
63
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 758–59 (suggesting that a market-centered
approach to lawmaking is fundamentally at odds with traditional notions of state
sovereignty).
64
See Edwards, supra note 35, at 455 (noting that individual consumers are often
protected based on notions of inequalities in bargaining power, but suggesting the
absence of such protections in the case of commercial parties lacking equal
bargaining power); see also generally Garvin, supra note 35.
56
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Clause of the United States Constitution.
However, the
extraordinary level of controversy surrounding section 1-301 seems
quite remarkable considering the nature of limited changes
proposed. In examining the import of the changes proposed by
section 1-301, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides a
66
useful point of reference.
The elimination of the “reasonable relation” requirement in
67
section 1-301 appears quite consistent with the Restatement approach.
Under this approach, the parties’ choice of substantive contract law is
to be given effect, irrespective of whether the transaction is
reasonably related to the state whose law is chosen, as long as there
68
exists a “reasonable basis” for the parties’ choice.
While section
1-301 does not include the latter limitation, it might to some extent
69
be implied based on the duty of good faith imposed in all contracts.
Thus, it would seem that the elimination of the reasonable
relationship requirement is consistent with existing law outside the
scope of the U.C.C.
The U.C.C. also includes choice-of-law provisions in Articles 4A,
5, and 8, which allow contracting parties to choose governing law
within the scope of those articles—without any requirement that the
70
transaction bear a reasonable relationship to the designated law.
Thus, it does not appear that there is, necessarily, any reason to
restrict party autonomy broadly within the U.C.C. as a whole.

65

See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1183 (arguing that complete respect for party
autonomy amounts to the use of one jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rules to subvert the
sovereignty of another).
66
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2).
67
See id.
68
Id. § 187(2)(a); see also Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Chair, Unif.
Commercial Code Article 1 Drafting Comm.; Professor Neil B. Cohen, Reporter; and
Professor Kathleen Patchel, Assoc. Reporter, to Members of the Am. Law Inst., Re:
Motion of Professor Jay L. Westbrook Regarding Proposed Revision of Article 1 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, Part B (May 10, 2001), http://www.ali.org/ali/
2001_Reporters_M3.htm [hereinafter Auerbach Memo in Response to Westbrook]
(explaining that the only real effect of the “reasonable basis” element of the test was
to add an element of uncertainty to the parties’ transaction and, thereby, support the
need for simplification of the issue under section 1-301).
69
See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001). For example, the choice of a body of law written
only in an obscure foreign language and chosen for purposes of making resolution
of disputes under the agreement more difficult would seem to violate the duty of
good faith in exercising the parties’ right to choose their own governing law under
U.C.C. § 1-301. Such a patently unreasonable choice in a transaction involving a sale
or lease of goods might also be subject to challenge based on unconscionability. See
Id. §§ 2-302, 2A-108 (2003).
70
See id. §§ 4A-507(b), 5-116(a), 8-110(e).
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Section 1-301 also adds an express “fundamental policy”
limitation on party autonomy, wherein the parties’ choice of law
would be ineffective to the extent inconsistent with a fundamental
policy of the jurisdiction whose law would otherwise govern in the
71
absence of an express choice by the parties.
While such an
72
exception might have been implied under former section 1-105, the
express inclusion of the exception in revised section 1-301 further
73
clarified the issue.
The foregoing debate was fully aired during the ALI review
74
process. In addition, proponents of revised section 1-301 pointed

71

See id. § 1-301(f) (2001); see also Auerbach Memo in Response to Westbrook,
supra note 68, Part E (explaining that this provided for greater limits in party
autonomy under section 1-301 in response to opposition to the elimination of the
reasonable relation requirement).
Section 1-301 does not address any potential effect of a fundamental policy of
the forum state (where the forum state’s law would not otherwise govern the
transaction, but for its status as the forum). U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 9 (2001). See
discussion infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing further the issue of whether or not a
fundamental policy of the forum should be relevant in deciding whether to enforce
the parties’ choice of law).
72
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.12; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
73
See Keeton, supra note 59, at 325.
In view of the express inclusion of a fundamental policy exception in section
1-301, the resistance of those opposed to UCITA, see infra Part II, would seem
misplaced. Many states opposing UCITA have enacted “bomb shelter” provisions,
which purport to bar the application of UCITA to their citizens. Woodward, supra
note 32, at 781. In a transaction between an Iowa licensee and a Virginia licensor
choosing Virginia Law (UCITA), section 1-301 of the revised U.C.C. would give effect
to the Iowa “bomb shelter,” while the language of former section 1-105 would not.
74
See, e.g., Woodward Memo, supra note 62; Memorandum from Boris Auerbach,
Chair, Unif. Commercial Code Article 1 Drafting Comm.; Professor Neil B. Cohen,
Reporter; and Professor Kathleen Patchel, Assoc. Reporter, to Members of the Am.
Law Inst., Re: Motion of Professor William J. Woodward, Jr., Regarding Proposed
Revision of Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code (May 10, 2001), http://www.
ali.org/ali/2001_Reporters_M2.htm; Westbrook Memo, supra note 62; Auerbach
Memo in Response to Westbrook, supra note 68. Interestingly, both sides purported
to support their arguments by reference to the same provisions of section 187 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. This illustrates quite clearly the lack of
predictability in resolving choice of law questions under the Restatement approach.
Proponents of section 1-301 also suggested that parties have always had
complete autonomy to choose controlling law, based on former section 1-102.
Auerbach Memo in Response to Westbrook, supra note 68, Part C (suggesting that
parties could choose the model UCITA to govern their transaction, even if they
could not choose Virginia’s statutory enactment of that model law). This argument
proves too much. If true, then the limitations of former section 1-105 are rendered
null. While former section 1-102 gives the parties the right to vary “the effects” of the
U.C.C. by agreement, it does not suggest that the parties may simply substitute an
entirely different body of law for the U.C.C.
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out its extremely limited application within the scope of the U.C.C.
However, the scope of this limited application happened to coincide
with the ongoing battle over the scope of Article 2 and the question
of whether, and to what extent, it should govern computer
information. At least some of the current criticism of section 1-301
can be attributed to the intense battle over the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”) and continuing concerns
over its potential application to transactions involving computer
software and related items. In order to better understand the nature
76
of this concern, a very brief history of UCITA is useful.
B. The Legacy of UCITA
UCITA grew out of the failed attempt of ALI and NCCUSL to
promulgate a new Article 2B of the U.C.C. concerning transactions
77
involving computer information and software.
Its proponents
believed that such transactions were not adequately dealt with under
Article 2, because they were not actually “sales of goods,” but were
78
instead mere licenses to use proprietary information or software.
This effort ultimately failed to gain the support of the ALI, largely
because the provisions were seen as too one-sided in favor of industry
79
NCCUSL then
and provided too little protection for licensees.
decided to promulgate that same body of law as UCITA—separate
75

See U.C.C. § 1-102 (2001); see also Memorandum from Boris Auerbach, Chair,
Unif. Commercial Code Article 1 Drafting Comm.; Professor Neil B. Cohen,
Reporter; and Professor Kathleen Patchel, Assoc. Reporter, to Members of the Am.
Law Inst., Re: Proposed U.C.C. Section 1-301 (May 10, 2001), http://www.ali.org/
ali/2001_Reporters_M1.htm.
76
For a more complete discussion of the history of UCITA and some of the issues
that led to its rejection in the vast majority of jurisdictions, see Roger C. Bern, “Terms
Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge
Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 773–83 (2004).
77
John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. &
COM. 1, 36–37 (2000); Gregory E. Maggs, The Waning Importance of Revisions to U.C.C.
Article 2, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595, 620 (2003); Jerry T. Myers, An Overview of the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 106 COM. L.J. 275, 275–76 (2001).
78
Murray, supra note 77, at 36–37; Maggs, supra note 77, at 617–20; Myers, supra
note 77, at 275–76.
79
Matthew J. Smith, Comment, An Overview of the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act: Warranties, Self-Help, and Contract Formation—Why UCITA Should Be
Renamed “The Licensors’ Protection Act,” 25 SO. ILL. U. L.J. 389, 392–93 (2001). Critics’
major concerns include: (1) the adoption of “layered” or “rolling” contract theory,
id. at 394–400; see also Murray, supra note 77, at 36–37; (2) extraordinary “self help”
remedies, Smith, supra, at 410–12; and (3) broad party autonomy in choice of
substantive law and forum, id. at 407–09. Arguably, the latter provision, granting
broad party autonomy has provided substantial fuel for the opposition to U.C.C.
§ 1-301. See discussion infra Part II.

GRAVES FINAL.DOC

2005]

10/11/2005 9:33:37 PM

AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF COMMERCIAL LAW

71

and apart from the U.C.C., but essentially governing the same body
80
of transactions as intended under proposed Article 2B. This effort
81
82
also largely failed, with only Virginia and Maryland adopting
83
UCITA, and there seems to be little, if any, likelihood of further
84
adoption in other states. Nonetheless, UCITA remains in force in
85
Virginia and Maryland.
Those opposing the adoption of section 1-301 of the U.C.C. fear
that many businesses providing software and other information will
include choice-of-law provisions in their contracts choosing Virginia
or Maryland law, thus subjecting those transactions to UCITA—a
86
body of law rejected by the vast majority of states. In fact, one of the
major criticisms of UCITA was the broad autonomy it granted parties
87
in choosing both a forum and the governing substantive law.
Parties could choose a forum adopting UCITA and then use this
permissive choice-of-law provision to ensure the application of
UCITA to their transaction—even if the transaction had no other
88
relationship to a state adopting UCITA. In choosing UCITA, parties
could also “opt-in” to UCITA in a mixed contract involving both
goods and software, thus potentially substituting provisions of UCITA
89
With the newly expanded party
for Article 2 of the U.C.C.

80

Myers, supra note 77, at 275–76; Maggs, supra note 77, at 620; see also NCCUSL,
A Few Facts About the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, http://
www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last visited
Oct. 3, 2005).
81
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (2001 & Supp. 2005).
82
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
83
Maggs, supra note 77, at 620; Murray, supra note 77, at 36–37.
84
See generally NCCUSL, UCITA Updates, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/ucita/
UCITA_Standby_Comm.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
85
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501 to 59.1-509.2 (2001 & Supp. 2005); MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
86
See Memorandum from Jay L. Westbrook to Members of the Am. Law Inst. Re:
Motion to Table Article 1 Proposals (May 7, 2001), http://www.ali.org/ali/2001
Westerbrook_M1.htm.
87
See supra note 79 (for critique of expanded party autonomy); see discussion
infra note 227 (for a discussion of relevant statutory provisions).
88
Woodward, supra note 32, at 704–05.
89
Id. at 740; UCITA § 104 (2000). Section 104, which had formerly allowed
parties to “opt-in” to UCITA for transactions otherwise beyond its scope, has been
removed from the current version, and now addresses new consumer protection
provisions. See UCITA § 104 (2002). Interestingly, Virginia has removed the former
“opt-in” provision from its statute and has added the new consumer protection
provisions that replaced it. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.4, -501.4.1 (2001 & Supp.
2005). However, Maryland addressed the primacy of its consumer protection laws in
its original statute and still retains the original “opt-in” provision. See MD. CODE ANN.,
COM. LAW §§ 22-104, 22-105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
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autonomy found in section 1-301 of the revised Article 1 of the
U.C.C., the opponents of UCITA saw a new and more broadly
applicable opportunity for private adoption of UCITA by commercial
90
parties.
As explained below in Parts III and IV, the effectiveness of these
efforts in avoiding application of UCITA by opposing section 1-301 of
the U.C.C. is questionable, and there may in fact be better ways to
address many of the identified concerns. However, for our purposes
here, it is worthwhile to step back at this point and ask the broader
question of why commercial parties might wish to choose a body of
substantive contract law of a state or nation to which the transaction
91
is not reasonably related.
C. Choice of “Unrelated” Law—Why Does It Matter?
Commercial parties typically form contracts in order to add
predictability to their prospective business dealings and protect their
92
intended expectations. The foundation of such predictability is the
93
substantive law that governs the parties’ transaction. Unfortunately,
the choice-of-law principles used to decide governing contract law are
94
not at all uniform and are often anything but predictable. Dean
Prosser’s oft quoted remarks arguably remain as true today as when
he made them: “[t]he realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp,
filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but
eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a
strange and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court or lawyer
95
Thus, the most
is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.”
90

Woodward, supra note 32, at 712, 740–41.
At least one scholar argued that parties should be allowed to contract around
even fundamental rules in certain circumstances in order to avoid the application of
inefficient mandatory rules. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in
Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003). While this Article finds support
from Professor Ribstein in many respects, it focuses instead on practical reasons for
affirmative choices of a given broad body of law and does not presume that the
parties will know at the time of contracting that they wish to avoid any particular
mandatory rule or violate any particular fundamental public policy of any relevant
state. See discussion infra Part VI.A.
92
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2; Patchel, supra note 50, at 118–19; NYGH,
supra note 38, at 2–3.
93
See Ribstein, supra note 91, at 403 (explaining that parties would not be able to
use optimal contract terms without knowing at the time of contracting what
substantive law would govern their transaction).
94
Woodward, supra note 32, at 703.
95
See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial Code,
62 LA. L. REV. 1097, 1133–34 (2002) (explaining that conflicts laws are notoriously
vague, often making it impossible to say in advance of litigation which state’s law will
91
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carefully crafted agreement may be an exercise in futility, unless one
can satisfactorily predict or choose the substantive law that will
96
govern that agreement. With international commercial agreements,
the number of possible legal regimes governing any transaction, and
97
the resulting unpredictability, is even greater.
The obvious answer to this dilemma is to allow the parties to
98
specify the governing substantive law within the agreement itself.
However, current domestic choice-of-law rules generally favor a
requirement “that the chosen law bear a relationship of some
99
significance to the transaction.” The Restatement also provides for
enforcement of the parties’ chosen law if the parties have a
100
“reasonable basis” for their choice.
However, this test has received
101
only mixed support by courts, and the use of such an amorphous
102
standard does little to enhance predictability —the parties’ likely
purpose in choosing their own governing law in the first place.
apply (citing William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971
(1953))).
96
One might reasonably ask whether this is really a significant issue under
domestic law in view of the near uniform adoption to date of the Uniform
Commercial Code. However, U.C.C. Article 2 governs only transactions in goods.
U.C.C. § 2-102. The greater body of contract law is governed by largely non-uniform
state law. Woodward, supra note 32, at 745. UCITA, the other notable attempt at
uniform law, has obviously been a failure to date. See supra Part II.B.
97
See Mel Kenny, Globalization, Interlegality and Europeanized Contract Law, 21 PENN
ST. INT’L L. REV. 569, 570 (2003).
98
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.1; see also David Hricik, Infinite Combinations:
Whether the Duty of Competency Requires Lawyers to Include Choice of Law Clauses in
Contracts They Draft for Their Clients, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 241, 243–
44 (2004) (suggesting that express provisions choosing substantive contract law will
ultimately increase certainty and reduce dispute resolution costs).
99
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.6; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971); U.C.C. § 1-105 (superseded 2001); see also Ribstein, supra
note 91, at 374–79 (providing empirical data in support of this position).
100
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971). In effect, the Restatement requires only a reasonable basis.
However, a choice of the law of a jurisdiction with a substantial relationship to the
transaction will always have a reasonable basis. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) cmt. f (1971).
101
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.9; Gina M. McGuiness, Comment, The Rome
Convention: The Contracting Parties’ Choice, 1 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 127, 163–64 (2000).
102
For example, courts are quite inconsistent in deciding whether the state of
incorporation of one of the parties provides a “reasonable basis” to support the
parties’ express choice of law. Some courts have found that the state of
incorporation alone is not enough to find a “reasonable basis” for application of a
choice-of-law provision. See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir.
1994) (finding that incorporation alone was insufficient and reasoning that
“[b]usinesses incorporate in Delaware in order to take advantage of that state’s
corporation law, and its judicial expertise concerning corporate governance, rather
than to conduct business there”); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224,
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At first blush, it may seem quite reasonable to limit parties’
choice of substantive law based on the reasonable relationship test, as
contained in former section 1-105 of the U.C.C. After all, this would
likely allow the parties to choose from any jurisdiction in which one
or both are located, the transaction is negotiated, formed, or
performed, or in some other fashion reasonably related to the
103
104
transaction itself.
However, there are a variety of affirmative
reasons why reasonable commercial actors might want to make other
choices—even choices that go beyond the broader autonomous
choices allowed under revised section 1-301.
105
For example, a North Dakota seller
of high technology
106
107
farming equipment and farm management computer software
1254 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (holding that the place of incorporation of a business is not,
by itself, sufficient).
However, other courts found that the state of incorporation alone is sufficient to
provide a “reasonable basis” to support the parties’ choice, and sometimes even gave
rise to a “substantial relationship” between the transaction and the chosen law. See,
e.g., Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 807 (D. Minn. 1989) (holding that
“[a] party’s incorporation in a state is a contact sufficient to allow the parties to
choose that state’s law to govern their contract”); Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Super. Ct.,
834 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Cal. 1992) (holding that incorporation in Hong Kong provided
for a “substantial relationship”); Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that “the mere fact that one of
the parties to the contract is incorporated in the chosen state is sufficient to support
a finding of ‘substantial relationship,’ and the mere fact that one of the parties
resides in the chosen state provides a ‘reasonable basis’ for the parties’ choice of
law”).
103
See U.C.C. § 1-105 cmt. 1 (superseded 2001).
104
This Article focuses on the reasons that commercial parties might affirmatively
choose to embrace a body of law, rather than the reasons parties might choose to
avoid a given body or specific rule of law. For a thorough analysis of the latter, see
generally Ribstein, supra note 91. While this Article makes a number of common
observations (and often relies on Professor Ribstein’s article for support), the choiceof-law proposed infra in Part VI differs substantially from that proposed by Professor
Ribstein in ways that reflect our differing perspectives.
I would not, however, suggest that the parties’ motives in choosing a particular
body of law should matter—short of perhaps bad faith or unconscionability. Such a
subjective inquiry would likely undermine any certainty gained from the parties’
express choice.
This is precisely the problem with the “reasonable basis”
requirement contained in the Restatement. See supra note 102; Joost Blom, Whither
Choice of Law? A Look at Canada and Australia, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP.
RESOL. 211, 237–38 (2004) (discussing the difficulties in such line-drawing based on
the parties’ motives).
105
In my example, I focus on the desire of a seller to choose a uniform law (e.g.,
in a price quotation). However, a buyer seeking to choose a uniform law (e.g., in its
purchase order) would face the same issues discussed herein.
106
Such high technology equipment might, of course, include significant
computer software components, thus calling into question whether Article 2 would
govern its sale. Abby J. Hardwick, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code: How Will a
Change in Scope Alter the Concept of Goods?, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 275–77 (2004).
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might have substantial business opportunities on both sides of the
Canadian border and might reasonably want to choose a single body
of law applicable to all of its sales transactions. Suppose our seller
would like to reach customers in North Dakota, South Dakota,
Montana, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario. In working with its
lawyers to draft a standard sales agreement, this seller might
reasonably seek to apply a single body of law to the agreement, thus
significantly enhancing the certainty and predictability of any
interpretation and application of the agreement in the event of any
108
dispute.
This seller might also reasonably believe that its customers, as a
whole, would be more receptive to a choice of governing law other
than North Dakota law, the application of which might be seen as
favoring our North Dakota seller, as compared to a buyer in another
state or a Canadian province. As a seller engaged in international
commerce, our seller might also believe that its Canadian customers
would be more receptive to a choice of an international body of law,
such as the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods
109
(“CISG”).
In fact, a choice of law, other than the seller’s own law, might
well be fairer to all of the parties involved. While it is hard to imagine
a seller agreeing to a choice of the law of the “buyer’s jurisdiction”
thereby subjecting the seller’s diverse interstate or international
transactions to an unreasonable level of uncertainty, the application
of “seller’s law” in all transactions may appear to disadvantage some
buyers. The availability of some neutral and perhaps mutually
advantageous body of law may provide a reasonable alternative
110
However, such a neutral
agreeable to both buyer and seller.
selection is impossible under the reasonable relationship test of
107

Such computer software would be even less likely to be governed by Article 2,
especially if Amended Article 2 is adopted. See U.C.C. § 2-103(k) (2001) (amended
2003) (excluding information from the application of Article 2 of the U.C.C.).
108
See, e.g., Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1993)
(holding the seller’s choice of New York law as a single body of law to govern all of its
transactions to be supported by a “reasonable basis”). But see infra text accompanying
note 111 (addressing the court’s refusal to enforce the parties’ choice).
109
In the absence of an express choice, the CISG would apply to this sale of goods
between parties from the United States and Canada—both CISG “Contracting
States.” See CISG, supra note 38, art. 1(1)(a) (applying to contracts for the sale of
goods between parties whose places of business are in different Contracting States,
absent a contrary express choice by the parties under CISG art. 6).
110
See Henry Mather, Choice of Law for International Sales Issues Not Resolved by the
CISG, 20 J.L. & COM. 155, 182 (2001) (suggesting that parties from differing
countries might want to choose the law of a neutral state, or even a-national law, such
that each would face roughly equivalent burdens and risks).
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111

section 1-105. If a seller wants to choose a single body of law, it has
only one option—that of the seller’s state.
A reasonable relationship test effectively drives both sellers and
112
buyers alike to act with a “domocentric” bias. If either wishes to
engage in interstate or international business transactions under a
single body of law, it must, necessarily, choose its own law. This
domocentric bias creates an inherent conflict between seller and
buyer. The obvious solution to the conflict is to grant buyers and
113
sellers a broader range of choices.
111

Such a neutral choice would also be impossible under the Restatement to the
extent it included sales between our North Dakota seller and a North Dakota buyer.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) cmt. d (1971) (limiting
the application of section 187 to transactions in which more than one state has an
interest); see also, e.g., Prows, 868 P.2d 809. In Prows, after agreeing that the seller’s
desire to have a single body of law govern all of its transactions provided a
“reasonable basis” for the parties’ choice of New York law, the court held the choice
“without effect,” ruling that Utah was the only state with an interest in the
transaction. Id. at 811 (specifically relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187(2)(a) cmt. d). Arguably, the court misapplied the Restatement rule to the
Canadian seller and Utah buyer, apparently reading “state” as limited to American
states, see id. at 809–11, but the case is nevertheless illustrative of the problem with
the multi-state limitation under the Restatement.
112
I use the term “domocentric” (from the Latin “domus” or “domo” meaning
home) here as a generic form of the term “Eurocentric,” describing a preference for
one’s own local body of law.
113
One might reasonably suggest that this problem is better addressed through
uniform law. Indeed, broad uniform adoption of the U.C.C. reduced the effect of
this domocentric bias in domestic interstate sales of goods over the past forty years.
However, uniform law does not guarantee uniform interpretation by state courts.
See, e.g., Erika E. Schinler, Trouble at the Sausage Factory: Has the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act Been Unjustly Stigmatized?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 507, 516 (2000)
(explaining that, while “the U.C.C. provides a nearly uniform backbone, consumer
product warranty law is not uniform; judicial interpretations of the U.C.C. vary, and
each state’s statutory scheme reflects differing needs and policies”); see also JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4 (5th ed. 2000)
(explaining that a variety of sources of non-uniformity are making the Code’s
conflicts rules increasingly important).
In addition, the U.C.C. covers a limited scope of transactions. It does not cover
sales of services or, arguably, licensing of computer information. The law applicable
to licensing of computer information is particularly uncertain today, see supra Part
II.B., and courts often struggle in deciding which law should govern a transaction
involving both goods and services. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra, § 1.1 (discussing the
majority predominant purpose test, but recognizing that it does not always work well
in mixed transactions).
Lastly, the future prospects for continuing uniformity under Article 2 appear
uncertain at best. See Rasmussen, supra note 95, at 1099–1100 (suggesting that the
U.C.C.’s focus on normative business practices and commercial reasonableness
inevitably leads to inconsistency in judicial interpretation). The 2003 Amendments
to Article 2 have yet to be adopted anywhere and may encounter significant
resistance, which in turn may lead to further lack of uniformity. In the absence of
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For example, our North Dakota seller might reasonably wish to
choose the law of a jurisdiction with a greater body of case law in
order to enhance the certainty of the content of its agreement and
the predictability of the resolution of any dispute under the
114
agreement.
With this in mind, the seller might, for example,
choose New York law. Or, perhaps, our seller of farming equipment
might prefer a body of law that is particularly well developed in
dealing with industry contracts involving farming equipment and,
115
However, none of these
thereby, choose the law of Minnesota.
choices would be enforceable under section 1-105 of the U.C.C.
because any transaction between our North Dakota seller and its
South Dakota, Montana, or Canadian buyers would have no
relationship to New York or Minnesota.
A seller might also reasonably wish to choose a single body of
international law, such as the CISG, for all of its transactions—both
domestic and international. However, the CISG would be unavailable
in this context to a domestic seller under either former section 1-105
or revised section 1-301(c)(1), because the CISG is only state law with
116
respect to international transactions.
Even if two domestic parties
expressly chose the CISG, it would not be the law of any state with a
117
reasonable relationship to such a wholly domestic transaction.
uniform substantive law, a commercial party can only achieve a reasonable degree of
legal certainty through ex ante choice of governing law.
114
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) cmt. f (1971)
(explaining that parties might reasonably choose a body of well-developed state
law—even though their transaction bore no relationship to that state).
115
The Author makes no representations as to the development of Minnesota law
in this area. The observation is made solely for hypothetical purposes.
116
The United States is a signatory to the CISG, a self executing treaty. RALPH H.
FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1.1 (2d ed. 2002). Thus, to
the extent the CISG is applicable to an international transaction involving an
American party, the CISG preempts any state enactment of U.C.C. Article 2 under
the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (“[A]nd all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land . . . .”); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941);
Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
892, 901 (2004).
117
Absent preemption by federal law, the relevant state statute would apply. In
fact, a seller might not even be able to choose the CISG as governing law in an
international transaction, absent its default application where the other contracting
party or parties are from CISG contracting states. Inasmuch as the United States has
made an Article 95 reservation, precluding the application of the CISG through
Article 1(1)(b) when the other party is not from a contracting state, the CISG is
arguably not the law of the United States with respect to such a transaction. Neither
is it the law of the non-contracting state in question. Thus, the parties arguably may
not choose the CISG if they choose to resolve their dispute in a jurisdiction that has
adopted U.C.C. § 1-105. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 116, § 1.5 (questioning the
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Thus, our seller would be precluded from choosing the CISG to apply
to all of its transactions—both domestic and international—even if
the other parties to the transaction shared precisely the same intent.
Moreover, the same parties discussed above might also wish to
choose some other body of law—one that is not the law of any
118
country. The provisions of the CISG are relatively brief
and
expressly exclude a number of legal issues that might reasonably arise
119
in the resolution of a commercial dispute. Additionally, the CISG is
limited to the sale of goods. It is not clear whether, or to what extent,
it might apply to transactions in “information” or computer software
that might also form a part of our hypothetical sales of farm
120
implement equipment.
Further, it would not necessarily be
121
suitable to govern any portion of a contract providing for services.
A party wishing to designate a more detailed and broadly
122
applicable choice of international law might reasonably choose the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT
123
Principles”) to govern all of its transactions. Or another seller doing
substantial business in Europe might wish to choose the Principles of

effectiveness of any attempt by the parties to “opt-in” to the CISG under such
circumstances).
118
See Lisa M. Ryan, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
Divergent Interpretations, 4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 101–02 (1995) (explaining that
the “CISG is an international compromise negotiated by countries with extremely
diverse” legal backgrounds and, therefore, contains some vague and abstract
language that can lead to inconsistent interpretation and application).
119
See, e.g., CISG, supra note 38, art. 3 (excluding sales of goods in which the labor
or service element predominates); id., art. 4(a) (excluding all questions of “validity”).
120
For example, such equipment might include computer software related to its
operation.
121
For example, our hypothetical sale of farm implement equipment might also
include a substantial service component.
122
See Sunil R. Harjani, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
in United States Courts, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 49, 68–69 (2000) (explaining that the
greater detail provided by the individual provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles may
avoid the temptation of national courts to fill gaps with their own domestic law, as is
often the case with the CISG); see also Peter A. Piliounis, The Remedies of Specific
Performance, Price Reduction and Additional Time (Nachfrist) Under The CISG: Are These
Worthwhile Changes or Additions to English Sales Law?, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 6 (2000)
(noting that, “while the international nature is similar to the CISG, the UNIDROIT
Principles are broader in scope and more detailed in provisions than the CISG”).
123
The UNIDROIT Principles specifically invite commercial parties to choose them
as governing law by express choice in both domestic and international transactions.
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, pmbl. cmts. 3–4. That invitation further
suggests that a party expressly chooses arbitration based on its greater deference to
party autonomy in choice of governing law. Id., pmbl. cmt. 4; see also infra Part III.
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124

European Contract Law
(“PECL”) to govern its transactions.
However, neither the UNIDROIT Principles nor the PECL have been
enacted by any state or country. As a-national or supranational
bodies of law, they would arguably be unavailable under either
former section 1-105 or under revised section 1-301(c) in either a
125
domestic or an international transaction.
In this Part, this Article suggested an affirmative rationale by
which parties might reasonably wish to be afforded a broader range
126
of choices of governing law,
while taking note of substantial
127
This leaves us with
opposition to such a broader range of choices.
two distinct questions. First, should the state allow parties to choose
the law of any state or nation—irrespective of whether the transaction
bears any relationship to that state or nation? Second, should the
state also allow parties to select their own governing contract law—
124

PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh
Beale eds., 2000) [hereinafter PECL]. The stated purposes of the PECL include
express adoption by parties as a neutral set of rules “drawing on the best solutions
offered by the laws of jurisdictions within (and sometimes outside) Europe.” Id. at
xxiii.
125
This Article focuses on choice of actual governing law rather than
incorporation by reference to provisions that the parties might have otherwise
included as provisions of the contract itself. The comments to section 1-301 suggest
that the provision allowing for “variation by agreement” contained in section 1-302
should be sufficient to accommodate the use of a-national law such as the UNIDROIT
Principles. U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 2 (2001). However, “variation by agreement” is not
the same as choice of governing law. While the comments to section 1-302 do not
precisely define the difference, U.C.C. § 1-302 cmts. 1, 2 (2001), there must be some
difference, or the limitations contained in section 1-301 are rendered a nullity.
Variation by agreement is likely limited to matters of incorporation that could
have been included in the parties’ agreement as express provisions—in effect,
allowing variation of default provisions of the U.C.C., but not its statutory rules. See
U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2001) (suggesting that parties are allowed to waive the writing
requirement under U.C.C. § 2-201, but cannot contractually eliminate the
requirement); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) & cmt. c
(1971) (explaining incorporation by reference under subsection 1 and
distinguishing between incorporation by reference and choice of law). Under
section 1-302, the parties’ choice of the UNIDROIT Principles to govern their contract
would not likely give effect to, inter alia, Article 1.2 (no writing required), Chapter 2,
Section 2 (authority of agents), or Chapter 3 (questions of validity, generally). See
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 38. Thus, the parties’ right to choose a-national
law can make a significant difference.
It is also interesting to consider the possibility that a country might adopt a
previously a-national body of law as its own. If so, then the body of law would
become an acceptable choice under revised section 1-301 in any international
transaction—no matter which country happened to adopt it. This seems an odd
result in that it grants greater deference to a completely unrelated country (one not
even chosen by the parties) than it grants to the parties.
126
See supra Part II.C.
127
See supra Parts II.A. and II.B.
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irrespective of whether such law has ever been enacted by any
relevant governmental body? Or, to put the question more broadly
and more succinctly, what, if any, limitations should American
domestic courts place on commercial parties’ rights to choose the
substantive law governing their contractual relationships? In an
effort to answer this question, I will start by comparing party
autonomy to choose governing contract law in domestic court
adjudication with that provided in arbitration.
III. EXPRESS CHOICE OF GOVERNING CONTRACT LAW
IN DOMESTIC COURTS VERSUS ARBITRATION
Contracting parties may choose to resolve the vast majority of
their disputes through binding arbitration in lieu of court
128
adjudication, and arbitrators routinely give effect to the parties’
express choice of law. The parties’ choices are respected—regardless
of whether the law has any other relationship to the transaction or
129
In
whether the law has been adopted by any governmental body.
128

Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of
“Alternative Dispute Resolution”, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 894 (2004); cf. THOMAS
E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 179–80 (2004).
129
While neither the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) nor the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act contain any express provision on choice of substantive law, the
United States Supreme Court’s deference to party autonomy in Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University fully supports such
respect for the parties’ choice. 489 U.S. 468, 478–79 (1989) (explaining that parties
to arbitration are free to structure their own agreements and enforcement according
to their terms is the principal purpose of the FAA—even if such enforcement has the
effect of replacing the FAA with relevant state law, notwithstanding the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution). See also generally Christopher R. Drahozal,
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004). But see generally Cindy G.
Buys, The Arbitrator’s Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in Commercial Arbitration,
79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 63 (2005) (explaining that domestic arbitrators might be
bound to follow the same choice-of-law rules as domestic courts, but suggesting that
such domestic arbitrators should instead follow the approach employed in
international commercial arbitration granting a greater degree of party autonomy).
In international commercial arbitration, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law of International Commercial
Arbitration (adopted by a variety of foreign countries and American states) expressly
states that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such
rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the
dispute.” UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art.
28(1) (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]. There is no express limitation
on this choice other than the rebuttable presumption that the parties’ choice refers
only to substantive law and not conflict of law rules. Id.; see also Fabrizio Marrella,
Choice of Law in Third-Millennium Arbitrations: The Relevance of the UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1137, 1154–55 (2003)
(discussing the parties’ broad power to choose governing law under a variety of
international arbitration rules).
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arbitration, application of the parties’ chosen law is near absolute,
absent a specific conflict with a particular public policy of an
interested state, as expressed in mandatory law or other expressions
130
This brings us to René David’s
of fundamental public policy.
131
132
observation, oft noted by Friedrich Juenger, that parties can, and
frequently do, avoid court imposed limits on party autonomy in
choice-of-law by simply choosing arbitration instead of court
adjudication.
Commercial parties choose arbitration over court adjudication
133
for a variety of reasons, including speed, privacy, and cost.
However, another significant reason parties choose arbitration is the
Parties may also choose their own industry-specific body or rules of law to govern
their dispute. For a variety of examples in which parties agree in advance to resolve
their disputes under private, non-governmental rules, see generally Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Imminent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992);
Lisa Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law: The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article
2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999); Lisa
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (1999).
130
See E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57 (2000)
(explaining the contours of the narrow, judicially developed, public policy exception
under which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award). In international
commercial arbitration, a public policy exception arises under article 5(2)(b) of the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5(2)(b), done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force with respect to the United States Dec. 29, 1970)
[hereinafter Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention]. An arbitrator has a duty to
render an award that is enforceable, see generally Martin Platte, An Arbitrator’s Duty to
Render Enforceable Awards, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 307 (2003), which, in the vast majority of
cases, depends on the application of the Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention,
CARBONNEAU, supra note 128, at 341–43. Thus, the arbitrator should not apply any
governing law that would violate the public policy of a likely enforcing state in a
manner that could render the award unenforceable under article 5(2)(b) of the
Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention. A similar public policy exception is found in
articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, supra note 129.
131
David, supra note 45, at 212.
132
See, e.g., Juenger, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 45, at 1133–34; Freidrich K.
Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 491–92 (1995) [hereinafter Juenger, American Conflicts
Scholarship]. The broad latitude afforded arbitrators in choosing the applicable
substantive law has arguably made traditional conflicts analysis less relevant.
Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract Choice of Law in the Americas, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 203
(1997) [hereinafter Juenger, Contract Choice of Law].
133
See, e.g., John H. Henn, Where Should You Litigate Your Business Dispute? In An
Arbitration? Or Through the Courts?, DISP. RESOL. J. Aug.–Oct. 2004, at 34, 36–38
(2004); CARBONNEAU, supra note 128, at 5–6.
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arbitrators’ respect for the parties’ right to choose their own
134
In fact, the UNIDROIT Principles specifically
governing law.
recommend that parties choosing the UNIDROIT Principles as
governing law should also choose arbitration in view of arbitrators’
135
Thus, we
greater deference to party autonomy in choice-of-law.
should expect that commercial parties looking for effective dispute
resolution might reasonably be influenced to choose arbitration over
court adjudication based on the greater likelihood that the former
will respect the parties’ express choice of law.
We can now return momentarily to our hypothetical North
136
Dakota seller of farming products. Assuming that our seller wants a
single body of substantive law applicable to all of its transactions and
does not want to alienate its buyers by demanding the application of
its own North Dakota law, the seller is encouraged to choose
arbitration where its choice of governing contract law will be
enforced. The seller will thereby avoid the limitations of North
Dakota’s enactment of section 1-105 of the U.C.C.
If by choosing arbitration, parties are in fact able to avoid
limitations on their right to choose their own governing law in
137
courts, then this leads to two questions. First, is this result a
desirable one? Second, if this distinction between arbitrators’ and
courts’ respect for party autonomy is not a desirable one, what should
be done to change the result?

134

See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look
at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 524 (2005) (citing Bruce L.
Benson, To Arbitrate or Litigate: That is the Question, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 91, 92 (1999));
Rachel Engel, Comment, Party Autonomy in International Arbitration: Where Uniformity
Gives Way to Predictability, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 323, 327–28 (2002).
135
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, pmbl. cmt. 4.
136
See supra Part II.C.
137
At this point, a reader might reasonably ask, “Why not simply restrict party
autonomy to choose governing law in arbitration?” Indeed, this would be one option
if the United States Congress or Supreme Court was inclined to do so. However, this
is beyond the power of the states under current Supreme Court interpretations of
the FAA. See Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, supra note 129, at 402–06
(explaining that federal law precludes state legislation invalidating arbitration
agreements, but nevertheless defers to party autonomy to choose governing law). In
Volt, the Supreme Court effectively placed party autonomy at the top of the hierarchy
in terms of choosing governing law in arbitration. Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs.
of Leland Standford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (explaining the FAA’s
“principal purpose of ensuring that private arbitration agreements are enforced
according to their terms”).
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A. Domestic Courts and Arbitration: Which Is More Likely To Be
Protective of State Sovereignty?
Opponents of increased party autonomy fear that a party or
parties will use such autonomy to circumvent laws enacted by
sovereign states. However, such fear assumes that parties do not have
an alternative avenue for exercising the level of autonomy denied by
the courts. If an alternative avenue is available, then court limits on
party autonomy will be ineffective. If that alternative avenue is even
less protective of state sovereignty than the courts, then greater
restriction on party autonomy in the courts may actually be
138
counterproductive.
1.

From What Are Sovereign States Trying to
Protect Parties?

Much of the resistance to expanded party autonomy in choiceof-law arises from the fact that many “bargains” are not based on
139
equal bargaining power.
In fact, I believe that most would agree
with the basic notion that contracts are often the product of unequal
bargaining power—even in non-consumer transactions. While legal
scholars might disagree as to what, if anything, the law should do
about bargaining inequities in commercial transactions, few would
argue that arbitration is likely to be more protective of the “weaker”
140
While some might argue
party to a bargain than domestic courts.
that arbitration agreements should not be enforceable under various
141
circumstances involving parties of unequal bargaining power, none
would likely suggest that weaker parties are somehow better off in
arbitration than in courts.
138

See Woodward, supra note 32, at 745. Professor Woodward expressly recognizes
this problem in arguing against choice-of-law provisions granting parties’ greater
autonomy in courts, noting that, “by refusing to enact [a provision granting greater
party autonomy, a] legislature may cede to the courts of other states the job of
declaring [its] fundamental policy.” Id. However, one can reasonably argue that
that job has already been ceded to arbitration panels, unless parties can be attracted
back to courts.
139
See Edwards, supra note 35, at 455; see also generally Daniel D. Barnhizer,
Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005).
140
See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2004, at 167, 179–80
(noting the breadth of the FAA in enforcing agreements to arbitrate—far beyond
commercial agreements between sophisticated commercial parties—and suggesting
legislative action to limit arbitration in certain circumstances).
141
See, e.g., Amy L. Ray, When Employers Litigate to Arbitrate: New Standards of
Enforcement for Employer Mandated Arbitration Agreements, 51 SMU L. REV. 441, 465–66
(1998) (noting arguments against enforcement of arbitration agreements in an
employment context).
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For example, if we return to our earlier discussion of the critique
of expanded party autonomy based on a fear that certain commercial
parties will choose UCITA as governing law in their form contracts of
142
adhesion, we can see that these same parties can easily get around
143
by simply adding arbitration
any limitation under the U.C.C.
provisions to their contracts, along with a provision choosing UCITA
as substantive law. In fact, with an arbitration provision, the parties
need not even designate Virginia or Maryland law—they can simply
designate UCITA directly.
Concerns over abuse of party autonomy are not, however,
limited to transactions in which a stronger party may try to take
advantage of a weaker one. Two parties may both wish to avoid the
law of a particular state and thereby choose an alternative body of
law. This issue is particularly likely to arise in circumstances in which
144
the law at issue is designed to protect non-parties to the transaction.
Again, the relevant question at this point is whether one believes that
a panel of arbitrators is more likely than a court to protect the
fundamental public policy of a particular state enacting such laws to
benefit its citizenry at large.
Inasmuch as arbitration allows parties to avoid many of the
limitations on their right to choose governing law in court
adjudication, parties are further encouraged to use arbitration and
discouraged from using courts to resolve commercial disputes. Thus,
limitations on choice-of-law may provide little, if any, protection to
parties trying to avoid the previously agreed upon law; those parties
simply end up in arbitration instead of the courts, but still under
their expressly chosen substantive law.
Another concern expressed by opponents of greater party
autonomy in choice-of-law is that of form contracts of adhesion. In
the real world of form contracts, actual assent is often more
142

See supra Part II.B.
This assumes, of course, that the U.C.C. and its choice-of-law contained in
Article 1 would apply—an assumption that is open to question. See discussion and
sources cited infra note 238.
144
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 n.19 (1985) (explaining that a choice of law and forum by the parties effectively
waiving antitrust remedies would be ineffective as against public policy); see also Erin
Ann O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of
Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1583 (2000) (explaining that costs based on the interests
of third parties or the public at large are often externalized by the parties to a
transaction, such that state regulation is required in order to protect these interests).
But see Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 260–61 (1993)
(suggesting that third parties can protect themselves, as long as transaction costs are
low).
143
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145

theoretical than real.
In the absence of “dickered terms” or some
other indication of actual bargaining, opponents argue that it is
unfairly surprising to subject a party to a form contract to the law of a
146
Again, however,
state that bears no relation to the transaction.
arbitration provisions in form contracts are routinely enforced,
147
Thus, unless the United
including any choice-of-law provisions.
States Supreme Court or the United States Congress decides to
reverse a solid trend favoring enforcement of arbitration provisions,
the form contracts argument serves little value. Again, parties
seeking autonomy in choice-of-law are simply driven to arbitration.
To the extent that limitations on choice-of-law are intended to
protect the weaker party to a bargain, they appear instead only to
drive more parties to arbitration. In arbitration, the weaker party is
no better protected than in the courts—and perhaps receives even
less protection. It would therefore appear that both parties to a
bargain might be better protected if both courts and arbitrators
consistently applied a uniform theory.
2.

Respect for State Sovereignty and Party Protection
Consistent With Both Arbitration and Court
Adjudication

The most obvious method to protect the weaker party to a
transaction and give effect to certain expressions of state sovereignty
is through the enactment of certain mandatory state laws. Such
148
mandatory laws or other expressions of fundamental public policy
may limit the effectiveness of choice-of-law provisions in both
149
150
and court adjudication.
For example, parties to
arbitration

145

See William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L.
REV. 971, 986–95. But see generally Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002).
146
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 741–42 (suggesting that a party to a small- to
medium-sized transaction will rarely, if ever, understand the significance of a choiceof-law provision); see also William J. Woodward, Jr., “Sale” of Law and Forum and the
Widening Gulf Between “Consumer” and “Nonconsumer” Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 243, 244 (1997) (noting the distinction between boilerplate and dickered terms
(citing K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (1939))).
147
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
148
European and international conflicts law often distinguishes between
“mandatory” rules of law and rules of law that violate a “public policy.” SCOLES ET AL.,
supra note 26, § 18.4(3). However, American law does not typically employ that
distinction. Id. Generally, a mandatory rule is one that must, affirmatively, be
applied, whereas a fundamental public policy violation may serve to preclude the
application of a rule. Patchel, supra note 50, at 140–41.
149
See discussion and sources cited supra note 130.
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commercial transactions governed by the Code might well be
precluded from choosing a body of law that encouraged bad faith
behavior, inasmuch as the requirement of “good faith” is sufficiently
fundamental that it might well trump the parties’ contrary express
151
The parties’ express
choice in either arbitration or litigation.
choice of UCITA, or Virginia’s statutory enactment of UCITA, might
also be ineffective if the transaction is sufficiently related to one of
the states that have enacted what has become known as a UCITA
152
Such laws, which have been enacted by a number
“bomb shelter.”
of states, specifically bar application of UCITA to the citizens of the
153
enacting state.
However, a law is not mandatory, nor a public policy
fundamental, simply because it would lead to a different result than
154
the law chosen by the parties.
For example, the requirement of a
writing to satisfy the statute of frauds in section 2-201 of the U.C.C.
would not likely trump the parties’ express choice of a body of law
155
Admittedly, it is sometimes
that did not require such a writing.
150

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971); SCOLES ET
supra note 26, § 18.12.
151
See U.C.C. §§ 1-302, 1-304 (2001).
152
As a result of the substantial controversy surrounding UCITA, some states
enacted so-called “bomb shelter” legislation, declaring any choice-of-law or choice-offorum provision invoking the application of UCITA to be void and unenforceable as
against public policy. KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 1.01[1][b]
(2004).
153
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 554D.104 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2001 & Supp.
2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2463a (Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-15
(LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
154
Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 921, 935 (1998). For example, if all forum law were deemed to rise to the
level of fundamental public policy of the forum state, then conflicts analysis would be
irrelevant, as forum law would always apply. Id. Instead, a fundamental public policy
should be construed narrowly and should only trump the parties’ express choice
when the chosen law “would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some
prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal.” Id. (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918)
(Cardozo, J.)).
155
For example, the CISG dispenses with any writing requirement and provides
for the enforcement of oral agreements. CISG, supra note 38, art. 11; see also John C.
Duncan, Jr., Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Considering Time
Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in
Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1363, 1373–74 (noting various
differences between the U.C.C. and CISG, including the statute of frauds in the
former and absence of any writing requirement in the latter). Inasmuch as the
United States could have avoided the application of Article 11 through an express
reservation under Article 96 (Russia, for example, did so based on a fundamental
public policy favoring enforcement of only written agreements), but did not, FOLSOM
ET AL., supra note 116, § 1.9, it would be hard to argue that any requirement of a
AL.,
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difficult to draw a precise delineation between laws sufficiently
mandatory or public policies sufficiently fundamental to trump the
parties’ express choice and those having no effect in the face of such
156
However, it seems a worthwhile endeavor when one
choice.
considers the alternatives of either unlimited party autonomy or
157
seemingly arbitrary limits imposed by a reasonable relationship test.
My intent here is simply to point out the commonality between both
arbitration and court adjudication, in that party choice of governing
law in each may be subject to what I will generally refer to as a
fundamental public policy exception.
Thus, it would seem that limitations on party autonomy, either
through the use of a reasonable relationship test or by limiting
parties to laws enacted by a sovereign, do little to protect state
sovereignty or the parties the state seeks to protect. Further, such
limitations are more likely to have the effect of making arbitration
the more desirable method of dispute resolution.
Instead,
mandatory state laws as expressions of fundamental public policy
would appear to have a more effective reach, limiting inappropriate
choices-of-law in both courts and arbitration proceedings.
3.

Why Would Courts Be Any More Protective of State
Sovereignty and Associated Party Protections?

If courts allowed parties the same broad autonomy they enjoy in
arbitration, then one might reasonably ask whether courts are any
more likely to be protective of state sovereignty than arbitrators. Or,
phrased more directly, have we simply engaged in a race to the
bottom? For at least two reasons, courts are in a better position to
protect state sovereignty and can do so in ways that will not
necessarily drive parties desiring autonomy in choice-of-law away
from court adjudication.
First, courts are more likely to grant an appropriate level of
deference to the public policies of other jurisdictions based on the
158
notion of comity. While often raised in an international context,
signed writing represents a fundamental public policy under an American state law.
See also Woodward, supra note 32, at 735 (acknowledging that a formality, such as a
statute of frauds requirement, would not likely be deemed sufficiently fundamental
to overcome the parties’ express choice of contrary law).
156
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 735 (expressing concern over the effectiveness
of any fundamental public policy exception based on the need to very narrowly
circumscribe its application).
157
For further discussion of the precise contours of an appropriate fundamental
public policy exception, see infra Part VI.B.1.
158
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 752–53.
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the underlying concept is the same and may apply equally as between
159
individual states of the Union. Each state court understands that its
own respect for the law of other states may effect the future decisions
160
of the courts of those states.
This motivation to exercise comity is
likely greatest with a uniform approach to choice-of-law, which
161
arguably best serves systemic interests of all states as a group.
Arbitrators, on the other hand, have no affiliation with a particular
sovereign and would, therefore, seem to have less reason to exercise
comity.
While the application of any exception to party autonomy may
undermine certainty to some degree, a narrowly tailored public
policy exception, administered with a reasonable dose of comity,
would seem to cost the parties very little in the way of certainty, while
offering the states an opportunity to preserve the most important
elements of sovereignty with respect to commercial agreements.
Second, there are additional safeguards against the abuse of
party autonomy in choice of governing law that arbitrators are not
likely to adopt, but that parties are less likely to find objectionable
than current limitations. A few simple formalities can go a long way
towards ensuring actual assent and reducing unfair surprise, and
parties acting in good faith are not likely to object to such safeguards,
as long as they are not unreasonably burdensome. These safeguards
162
are discussed further in Part VI.
Assuming that courts might be at least marginally more
protective of state sovereignty than arbitrators, we must next ask
whether state courts want to compete to regain some of those cases
currently lost to arbitration. After all, these are entirely different
types of institutions, with sometimes entirely different agendas.
C. Domestic Courts Versus Arbitration—Do Domestic Courts Want to
Compete With Arbitrators for Commercial Disputes?
As an initial matter, it should be noted that courts may be much
less deferential to party autonomy in choice of governing law because
courts are public rather than private institutions. In fact, one reason
159

See 81A C.J.S. States § 57 (2004).
See Ribstein, supra note 91, at 436–37 (explaining the reciprocal nature of state
court choice-of-law decisions); see also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 17 (1998)
(discussing the application of comity by a Texas court based on notions of reciprocity
(citing K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. 1994))).
161
Patchel, supra note 50, at 127–28. See infra Part VI.A for further discussion of
the need for uniformity in choice-of-law and the role of comity in maximizing the
value of such uniform law.
162
See infra Part VI.B.
160
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that arbitrators respect party autonomy is because arbitrators are
163
private actors competing for dispute resolution business.
Presumably, parties choosing substantive law at the time of their
agreement will also want to choose a dispute resolution body that will
164
Thus, the greater the deference to party
respect that choice.
autonomy by arbitrators, the more likely that arbitrators will get
parties’ future business.
At first blush, one might reasonably suggest that states have a
contrary interest—clearing court dockets and reducing the public tax
burden—and that interest might be advanced by refusing to respect
165
the parties’ choice of law outside of certain limits. However, others
have observed that the trend towards arbitration has indeed had
166
numerous adverse effects on state courts and state law.
The trend towards arbitration of commercial disputes has led to
a significant reduction in the number of published opinions, thus
167
retarding the development of the common law.
Arbitrators rarely
168
publish opinions,
and arbitration is not typically subject to
169
Thus, published appellate
appellate review for errors of law.
judicial opinions, the staple of common law development, are lost in
170
the process.
Without such opinions, the law is no longer able to
171
meet evolving commercial norms.
Appellate judicial opinions also provide commercial parties with
valuable guidance as to likely resolution of common commercial legal

163

Ribstein, supra note 91, at 423; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability:
Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1282 (2000) (noting an
arbitrator’s strong incentive to honor the parties’ choices—perhaps even to the
extent of ignoring contrary mandatory rules); Drahozal, Contracting Out of National
Law, supra note 134, at 524.
164
See supra Part III.A.
165
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 777–78 (noting that any choice-of-law
provision that invites litigation to an enacting state will increase the courts’ caseload
in that state, which could, among other things, have adverse budgetary implications).
166
See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 167–75.
167
Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30
(2004); Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business and Commercial
Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183, 188 (2000).
168
Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 167, at 29.
169
Id. at 28.
170
Id. at 30 (noting the lack of precedential value of arbitral awards); see also
Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators’ Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory Arbitration for
Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 22 (2003).
171
Carr & Jencks, supra note 167, at 198–99 (noting the inability of the courts to
adapt to the needs of a business community that increasingly resolves its disputes
behind the closed door of arbitration).
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172

issues. Without this judicial guidance function, the predictability of
commercial law is diminished and commercial parties are faced with
173
greater uncertainty in their dealings.
The reputation of state courts and judges will also likely suffer, as
these courts are left with few significant commercial cases with which
to maintain a level of proficiency. The fewer commercial cases
handled by our state courts, the greater the trend towards other
venues for dispute resolution, and some of our best commercial
174
jurists may be lost to the courts as well.
In at least some cases,
judges could be lost because they miss the enjoyment of interesting
commercial disputes and do not want to spend the vast majority of
175
Thus, the loss of interesting commercial
their time on drug cases.
cases to arbitration likely helps to fuel the judicial exodus, including
moves by many judges to arbitration.
At least a few states are trying to reverse this trend and attract
commercial dispute resolution back to the courts and away from
176
arbitration.
This phenomenon is similar in some aspects to the
development of the Delaware Chancery Court as the preferred venue
177
If these efforts are successful, the
for corporate litigation.
development of the state’s commercial law is enhanced, as is the
quality of the local judiciary and practicing bar.
However, one might argue that state courts, unlike arbitrators,
should limit themselves to their own state law and should not be
required to adjudicate cases under substantive law with which they
178
are not familiar. Inasmuch as courts are often called upon to apply
172

Cf. Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 167, at 35.
Carr & Jencks, supra note 167, at 187 n.4.
174
Cf. Rex S. Heinke, The Case for Raising Judicial Salaries, 23 L.A. LAW. 10, 10
(2001) (noting a variety of issues leading to a judicial “brain drain”).
175
See Joseph T. McLaughlin, A View From the Front Lines, 59 ALB. L. REV. 971, 977
(1996) (explaining that judges are competitive creatures who hate to see many of
their most interesting cases go off to private dispute resolution).
176
See, e.g., Charles E. Ramos & Alvin K. Hellerstein, A View From the Judiciary, 5
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 129, 139 (2000) (discussing the efforts of the specialized
New York commercial courts to enhance their reputation, nationally and
internationally, and to compete with arbitration for the resolution of sophisticated
commercial disputes). For a further discussion of this trend, see infra Part IV.
177
Id. at 138; see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the
Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1212–15 (2001) (explaining some
of the perceived advantages of choosing Delaware as a state of incorporation).
Delaware also enacted a choice-of-law statute allowing parties to choose the
commercial law of Delaware—whether or not the parties’ transaction has any
relationship to Delaware other than the choice of its law and forum for dispute
resolution. See infra Part IV and note 201.
178
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 778.
173
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the law of another state, that argument fails, at least with respect to
domestic state laws. However, it bears some examination with respect
to the laws of a foreign country or a body of law adopted by no state
or nation.
Admittedly, arbitrators may be chosen for their specific legal
expertise when parties have chosen a unique body of substantive law,
and this might arguably serve as a distinction between courts and
arbitration. However, one of the unique things about common law
legal systems like ours is the significant role played by the parties in
developing the legal issues. Unlike a civil law court, a common law
court relies primarily on the parties to identify and apply the relevant
179
law.
The role of the court is typically to choose between the
parties’ positions, as to which represents a more appropriate
application of controlling law to the facts of the case. This may or
may not be true in arbitration.
Thus, a common law court should not be overly burdened by
having to apply novel law when the parties will serve to direct and
focus that court on the relevant controlling law. Many courts are
faced with this task every day with the vast body of law potentially
applicable in a court of general jurisdiction. In fact, a court
operating in the common law tradition would seem ideally suited to
apply a previously unfamiliar body of commercial law, as explained
and argued by the parties to the dispute.
Last, but certainly not least, courts, as instruments of the state,
have an interest in furthering state sovereignty by ensuring that the
most fundamental policies of relevant states are given effect,
180
This may
notwithstanding any contrary law chosen by the parties.
be accomplished directly, where a fundamental public policy of the
forum state is sufficiently implicated by the transaction, or indirectly,
by giving due deference to the fundamental public policy of another
state where appropriate and, thereby, promoting a practice of comity
181
between states under such circumstances.
If one agrees that states indeed have an interest in encouraging
commercial parties to favor court resolution of their disputes over
arbitration, then we must next look at the possible motivations of the
parties. Are courts likely to be effective in competing with arbitration
for the dispute resolution business of these parties?

179

KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 266–
67 (2d ed. 1987).
180
See supra Part III.A.2.
181
See supra Part III.A.2.
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C. Domestic Courts Versus Arbitration—Might Commercial Parties
Sometimes Prefer Court Adjudication?
As stated earlier, commercial parties choose arbitration over
court adjudication for a variety of reasons, including speed, privacy,
182
and cost.
However, there are a number of reasons for parties to
favor court adjudication over arbitration in many circumstances. No
system of dispute resolution is likely to gain the favor of all parties in
all cases, and commercial parties will likely continue to use a broad
variety of mechanisms to resolve their disputes. However, a greater
respect for party autonomy in choice of governing law might, in some
instances, tip the balance towards court adjudication over arbitration.
One of the potential advantages of court adjudication is cost—
traditionally thought of as an advantage of arbitration. Today, with
increasing discovery and other procedural complexities of
arbitration, the parties’ costs and attorneys’ fees are often beginning
183
to approach those of court adjudication.
However, parties to
184
the
arbitration must also pay for the chosen arbitral body,
arbitrators, and the physical setting for the arbitration, the cost of
which is substantially greater than the fees associated with court
185
Thus, in many instances, the issue of cost may
adjudication.
actually favor court adjudication.
Arbitration may also lack many valuable procedures available in
court adjudication. For example, arbitration may not provide for
summary adjudication available in courts, thus requiring more time
and expense to arbitrate fully disputes that might be resolved more
186
Arbitration may also
quickly on a summary basis by a court.
187
disadvantage certain parties due to limitations on discovery.

182

See supra Part III.A.
Ramos & Hellerstein, supra note 176, at 135; Alleyne, supra note 170, at 30;
Stipanowich, supra note 128, at 895.
184
This assumes that institutional arbitration is chosen. If not, then presumably
the arbitrators’ fees will be increased, as they must assume any administrative duties.
185
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12 & 56; Alleyne, supra note 170, at 30.
186
Alleyne, supra note 170, at 41–42; John Fellas, A Fair and Efficient International
Arbitration Process, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2004, at 78, 79; Henn, supra note 133, at
37 n.14. But see Martha Neil, Litigation Over Arbitration: Courts Differ on Enforceability of
Mandatory Clauses, 91 A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (Jan. 2005) (suggesting that summary
adjudication is beginning to appear in arbitration); Elizabeth B. McCallum & Mark
McCareins, Arbitration Procedures: The Rules of the Road in Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, at 15, 18–19 (explaining where arbitrators might find a power
of summary adjudication not expressly addressed by the rules).
187
Michael M. Marick et al., Excess, Surplus Lines and Reinsurance: Recent
Developments, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 231, 232 (1991). While for many, such limitations
183
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Extraordinary remedies, such as injunctions or specific performance,
may only be enforced with the aid of courts, thus necessitating an
188
In addition, courts are often
extra step effecting such relief.
involved, either pre- or post-arbitration, in deciding whether the
arbitration agreement is enforceable in the first instance and whether
189
any award is enforceable in the last.
Arbitration awards may also be less predictable than full and
final court adjudication, as arbitrators are sometimes prone to
190
“compromise” decisions.
Moreover, arbitration awards are not
typically subject to appeal for simple, though perhaps determinative,
191
While many parties have attempted to agree
errors of law.
contractually to full appellate review of any arbitration award, under a
de novo standard on errors of law, the enforceability of such
provisions under the Federal Arbitration Act is the subject of a
192
significant split of authority.
Without any clear idea as to how the

are a significant advantage of arbitration, this advantage may sometimes disadvantage
a particular party that does not have access to crucial information.
188
See id.
189
See Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As) sumed “Consent” of Commercial Binding
Arbitration Contracts: An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional
Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 595 (2003); David S. Schwartz, Understanding
Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38
U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 74–75 (2003). This additional court litigation, which is often
necessary, is another factor that often makes arbitration more expensive than court
adjudication, despite its reputation to the contrary. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN
HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1–46 (4th
ed. 2004); CARBONNEAU, supra note 128, at 25 (each describing various circumstances
in which parties to arbitration may be required to seek court assistance).
190
Marick et al., supra note 187, at 232; see also Stipanowich, supra note 128, at 895.
While compromise decisions may be desirable in some cases, many commercial
transactions are sufficiently significant to the parties involved that a compromise
decision may be undesirable. See Stephen P. Younger, Corporate Policies for the Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Reduce Litigation Costs, 833 PLI/CORP. 165, 219 (1993).
191
See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 359 (1995). But see
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules,
and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 429–33 (2003)
(suggesting that arbitration awards may indeed be subject to vacateur for simple
errors of law where the selected rules of express terms of the parties’ agreement
support such an outcome).
An arbitration award may be vacated for certain limited procedural infirmities,
see 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. 2002), as well as the judicially created “manifest
disregard of the law.” See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953). However,
decisions finding the latter “manifest disregard” standard satisfied are quite rare.
192
See generally Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (2004); Milana Koptsiovsky,
Note, A Right to Contract for Judicial Review of an Arbitration Award: Does Freedom of
Contract Apply to Arbitration Agreements?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 609 (2004).
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United States Supreme Court will resolve this issue, parties are unable
to count on appellate review of arbitration awards with any
reasonable level of certainty.
In summary, it would seem that parties may have a variety of
reasons to favor court adjudication over arbitration in some
circumstances and may, therefore, be quite receptive to efforts by
courts to attract the resolution of their disputes. While the greater
degree of party autonomy afforded to parties by arbitrators, as
compared to courts, is understandable in a historical context, it is
much less clear that such a distinction is necessary or even desirable
today. In fact, a number of state legislatures have passed choice-oflaw statutes in which the express or implied goal has been to attract
commercial cases to their state courts. While these various statutes
share some things in common, they also include a variety of key
differences. These commonalities and differences are explored in
Part IV.
IV. CURRENT DOMESTIC STATUTES GRANTING EXPANDED PARTY
AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF CONTRACT LAW
Commercial parties seeking expanded party autonomy in
choice-of-law are not limited to arbitration. A number of states have
enacted statutes that allow parties to choose the law governing their
contractual relationship—irrespective of whether the transaction has
any relationship to the law chosen, and irrespective of whether the
transaction bears any relationship to more than one state or
193
country.
In Oregon courts, parties may even be able to choose a194
To the extent that
national law, such as the UNIDROIT Principles.
other states will offer greater deference to party autonomy, a state
attempting to limit such autonomy will likely fail if parties simply
195
Other domestic
choose to resolve their disputes in other forums.
state statutes governing choice-of-law are also instructive in
considering a possible model statute.

193

See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See infra note 214.
195
A choice of governing law is presumed to be limited to substantive law and
does not include choice-of-law provisions. Woodward, supra note 32, at 702–03.
Instead, the forum applies its own choice-of-law provisions, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the parties. Id. at 703 (acknowledging that the selection of the
forum will determine the choice-of-law rules applied).
194
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A. A Survey of Available Choice-of-Law Rules
The most common state statute allows parties to choose forum
law in transactions involving a specified minimum dollar amount.
196
197
198
199
For example, California, Florida, Illinois, and New York allow
parties to litigate commercial disputes of at least $250,000 in the
200
courts of each state and under that state’s law—irrespective of
whether the transaction is otherwise related to the state. Delaware
201
law allows such a choice for disputes of at least $100,000.
Each of
these statutes takes precedence over these states’ enactment of
202
Like
section 1-105(1) of the U.C.C. for any qualifying transaction.
former section 1-105(1), none of these statutes include an express
exception where the parties’ choice conflicts with the fundamental
public policy of a relevant jurisdiction. However, such an exception
203
might reasonably be implied.
While the aforementioned statutes are limited to choice of
forum law, other states have choice-of-law statutes without such limits.
196

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2005).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101(1) (West 2003). The Florida statute is unique in that
it does not apply to contracts without a reasonable relationship to Florida, unless one
of the parties is either: (1) a Florida party; or (2) a non-U.S. party. Id.
§ 685.101(2)(a). Inasmuch as a Florida party is likely to provide for a reasonable
relationship to Florida, that statute seems to grant broad autonomy only to contracts
involving a foreign party and choosing Florida law.
Ohio also has a choice-of-law statute that appears to grant broad party autonomy
to choose Ohio law, without any dollar limit and without any reasonable relationship
requirement, but limited to actions against foreign parties. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.39 (LexisNexis 2005). Notably, that statute appears to provide for this choice
only “against” foreign parties and not by those same foreign parties. Id..
198
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2003).
199
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2001).
200
Each of these four states also has statutes conferring personal jurisdiction over
the parties, based on their choice of forum law. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp.
2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101(1) (West 2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5
(West 2003); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2001). However, where
jurisdiction is based solely on such choice, Illinois law raises the transactional
threshold amount to $500,000, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5, and California
raises it to $1,000,000, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5.
201
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2708 (1999).
202
While not excepting transactions covered by U.C.C. § 1-105(1), each statute
includes an express exception for those specific U.C.C. choice-of-law provisions
addressed by section 1-105(2). CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2005); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2708 (1999 & Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101(1) (West
2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2003); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2001). All except Delaware also exempt transactions
involving labor or personal, family, or household services. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101(1); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 5-1401(1).
203
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.12.
197
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In transactions of at least $1,000,000, Texas courts allows parties to
choose the law of any jurisdiction, irrespective of any reasonable
204
This
relationship between the transaction and the chosen law.
statutory provision takes precedence over the Texas enactment of
section 1-301 of the U.C.C. which retained the limitations of former
205
The Texas statute also contains a unique provision,
section 1-105.
expressly precluding the application of any otherwise applicable
fundamental public policy of another state, provided that the
206
This is
transaction bears a reasonable relationship to the chosen law.
the only domestic choice-of-law provision, applicable to court
adjudication or arbitration, in which parties can specifically avoid an
otherwise applicable fundamental public policy.
Louisiana law allows parties to choose the law of any jurisdiction,
irrespective of any reasonable relationship between the transaction
and the chosen law, and without any limitation as to the amount of
207
Parties may also choose multiple sources of law,
the transaction.
208
The Louisiana
applicable to various parts of their agreement.
choice-of-law statute is, however, expressly limited to the extent that

204

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(c) (Vernon 2002). These are defined as
“qualified” transactions. Id. § 35.51(a).
205
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301(c) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004–2005) (a
non-uniform adoption of section 1-301 of the U.C.C.). “Qualified transactions” were
also exempted from the limitations of the state’s prior enactment of section 1-105 of
the U.C.C. Id.
206
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(b) (Vernon 2002). This provision is
subject to a variety of exceptions, including issues of validity or enforceability, as well
as contracts involving real property, marriage, wills, and contrary Texas or federal
statutes. Id. § 35.51(b). See also Ribstein, supra note 91, at 450–51 (proposing a
similar approach in a model choice-of-law rule allowing parties to avoid otherwise
applicable public policy where the transaction bears a reasonable relationship to the
chosen law).
In an apparent effort to add certainty with respect to any attempt by parties to
rely on this provision, the statute also expressly defines a “reasonable relationship” to
a chosen jurisdiction to include: (1) residency of a party in the jurisdiction; (2) a
relevant place of business in the jurisdiction; (3) location of the subject matter of the
transaction in the jurisdiction; (4) performance of a substantial part of a party’s
obligations, such as delivery of payments; or (5) a substantial portion of the
negotiations and the signing of the agreement at issue in the jurisdiction. TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(d) (Vernon 2002). Thus, the parties can choose any state
law and expressly avoid any otherwise applicable fundamental public policy by simply
choosing a location for receipt of payments or negotiation and execution of the
agreement.
207
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3540 (1994).
208
Id. art. 3540 cmt. e. This process is known as contractual depecage. 16 AM. JUR.
2D Conflict of Laws § 6 (2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 187 cmt. i (1971) (recognizing the parties’ right to contractual depecage in this
comment added in 1988).
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such a choice would contravene the public policy of the state whose
209
In contrast to other
law would govern absent the parties’ choice.
statutes discussed thus far, the Louisiana statute includes section
1-105(1) of the U.C.C. in its exceptions deferring to other, more
210
The Louisiana legislature has not yet considered
specific, statutes.
revised U.C.C. Article 1. In view of its broad deference to party
autonomy in its general statute governing contractual choice-of-law, it
will be interesting to see whether the legislature decides to adopt the
uniform version of section 1-301 of the U.C.C., with its own nod
towards greater party autonomy.
In 2001, Oregon enacted the most recent, and arguably the most
211
modern, statutory scheme governing contractual choice-of-law.
212
While
The Oregon statute allows the parties to choose any “law.”
the statute appears to limit the definition of “law” to a body of rules
“adopted by a state,” this statutory definition is written quite broadly
213
To the
in providing for a wide variety of derivations of such “law.”
extent that the statutory definition of “law” is unclear, the comments
state that the definition includes model rules or principles such as
214
the UNIDROIT Principles —an a-national body of law. Like the
Louisiana statute, the Oregon statute allows parties to choose
multiple sources of law, applicable to various parts of their
215
agreement.
The Oregon statute also includes a public policy exception,
expressly excepting choices by the parties requiring acts prohibited
or prohibiting acts required by the law of the state in which such
216
performance was to take place.
Additionally, the statute excepts
any application that would contravene an established fundamental
217
policy of the law that would otherwise govern the issue in question,
but narrowly limits such policies to those implicating “essential public
or societal institutions beyond the allocation of rights and obligations

209

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3540 & cmt. f (1994).
Id. art. 3540 cmt. a.
211
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 81.100–81.135 (2003).
212
Id. § 81.120(1).
213
Id. § 81.100.
214
James A. R. Nafziger, Oregon’s Conflicts Law Applicable to Contracts,
38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 397, 421 (2002).
215
OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120(1) (2003).
216
Id. § 81.125(1)(a)–(b). It seems reasonable that parties should not be able to
use courts in one state to enforce agreements they consider illegal simply by
choosing another state’s law.
217
Id. § 81.125(1)(c).
210
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218

of parties to a contract at issue.”
The statute further includes a
219
Not only
unique provision addressing standard-form contracts.
must any choice-of-law provision be express, but it must also be
220
“conspicuous.”
The Oregon statute provides exceptions for a variety of specific
221
types of contracts governed by Oregon law, as well as issues of
222
The statute also defers to any other Oregon
capacity and consent.
statute expressly designating applicable law, including Oregon’s
223
enactment of former section 1-105 of the U.C.C.
Like Louisiana,
Oregon recently enacted a statute granting parties a large degree of
224
autonomy in contractual choice-of-law. Thus, its legislature may be
more likely than others to give serious consideration to the uniform
version of section 1-301, as part of revised Article 1.
The domestic choice-of-law statutes granting parties the most
225
autonomy in choice of law within their scope are the Maryland and
226
Virginia enactments of UCITA. These statutes each grant the
parties complete autonomy to choose any body of law, irrespective of
any relationship to the transaction and irrespective of whether such
227
The only
law has ever been adopted by any government.
228
restrictions relate to consumer transactions.
While the application
of the Virginia statute is generally limited to the elements of the
229
the Maryland statute is
transaction expressly within its scope,
subject to much broader application based on its “opt-in” provisions
218

Id. § 81.125.
Id. § 81.120(2).
220
Id.
221
OR. REV. STAT. § 81.105 (2003).
222
Id. §§ 81.112, 81.115.
223
Id. § 81.102; see also Nafziger, supra note 214, at 419, Annex III (listing various
specific unaffected Oregon statutes, including Oregon’s enactment of U.C.C.
§ 1-105).
224
OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120(1) (2003).
225
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
226
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 59.1-509.2 (2001 & Supp. 2005).
227
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-109(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-501.9(a) (2001 & Supp. 2005). Curiously, the Virginia statute includes a very
simple approach to choice-of-law in the absence of an express choice by the parties.
It chooses Virginia law, in effect, turning any selection of a Virginia forum into a
dispositive choice of Virginia law. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.9(b). By comparison,
both UCITA and the Maryland statute provide for a more complex analysis,
including an examination of the jurisdiction to which the transaction is most
significantly related. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-109(b); UCITA § 109(b)
(2002).
228
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-105(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-501.9(a) (2001 & Supp. 2005).
229
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.3 (2001 & Supp. 2005).
219

GRAVES FINAL.DOC

2005]

10/11/2005 9:33:37 PM

AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF COMMERCIAL LAW

99

230

applicable to mixed transactions.
Under Maryland law, parties can
expressly choose UCITA as the law governing the entirety of any
transaction, as long as any material part of the transaction is within its
231
scope.
Neither the Virginia statute nor the Maryland statute includes a
fundamental policy exception tied specifically to its choice-of-law
provision. Each statute does include a provision granting a court the
discretion to refuse to enforce any contract term that “violates a
232
fundamental public policy.”
However, the provision addresses
contract terms, generally, and does not, under any circumstances,
233
It is not at all clear
require a court to defer to such public policy.
whether, or under what circumstances, this provision might provide a
basis for a court to defer to a body of governing law other than that
234
chosen by the parties.
B. Forum Selections Based on Available Choice-of-Law Rules
Having explored a number of these domestic choice-of-law
statutes granting various degrees of party autonomy to choose
governing law in courts, without limitations based on any “reasonable
relationship” or “reasonable basis” test, we can again return to our
hypothetical North Dakota seller of farm products to show the effect.
If the transaction is sufficiently large, and the seller also selects its
forum for dispute resolution in the courts of the state whose law is
chosen, its choice of California, Delaware, Illinois, or New York law
235
Or, if the transaction was even larger, our seller
will be effective.
could choose a forum in Texas courts and choose the law of any
236
jurisdiction as governing law.
Our seller’s ability to choose law in smaller transactions is
somewhat more limited, but nevertheless available in a variety of
230

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-104 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
Id.
232
Id. § 22-105(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.5(b) (2001 & Supp. 2005).
233
See sources cited supra note 232. The comments to the UCITA cite only the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) in support of the provision. A citation to
section 187(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), which expressly
addresses a fundamental public policy exception to party autonomy in choice-of-law,
is conspicuously absent. UCITA § 105 cmt. 3 (2002).
234
This is a particularly important question in view of the number of states that
have enacted UCITA “bomb shelters” in an effort to avoid its application to their
citizens. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
235
See discussion and sources cited supra notes 196, 198–99, 201. Florida is
omitted from this group based on the assumption that the transaction might not
include either a Florida party or an alien. See supra note 197.
236
See discussion and sources cited supra note 204.
231
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circumstances. The seller could choose Oregon or Louisiana courts,
and these courts would enforce seller’s choice of law in most
commercial contracts other than those governed by U.C.C. Article
237
Or, if a material part of the transaction involved computer
2.
software or other items within the scope of UCITA, our seller could
choose venue in Maryland, opt-in to UCITA’s choice-of-law
provisions, and then choose any law it wanted to govern the entire
238
transaction —assuming of course, its buyers agreed.
When one considers the variety of currently available statutory
choice-of-law regimes, it becomes obvious that parties already have
substantial autonomy to choose governing contract law in a
significant number of domestic courts. By restricting party autonomy
in its own courts, a state seems to be simply abdicating its opportunity
to develop or apply any reasonable limits to party autonomy based on
239
fundamental policy exceptions.
This broad trend towards greater
party autonomy in choice of governing contract law is further
exemplified by foreign and international approaches.
V. EXPRESS CHOICE OF GOVERNING CONTRACT LAW UNDER
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Most modern foreign choice-of-law rules for contracts and
international commercial choice-of-law conventions at least allow
parties to choose the substantive law of any nation (or political
subdivision thereof). To that extent, those conventions are largely
consistent with section 1-301 of the U.C.C. and its approach to
expanded commercial party autonomy. In fact, its proponents argue
that the revision is needed in order to “modernize” U.C.C. choice-of240
law provisions consistent with international choice-of-law rules.
237

See discussion and sources cited supra notes 207, 212. Of course, if any of the
states currently considering revised Article 1 were to enact uniform section 1-301, see
supra Part I, the parties’ choice of governing law in transactions otherwise within the
scope of the U.C.C. would largely be given effect.
238
See supra Part II.B. It is also worth noting here that the parties might be able to
choose Maryland law to govern a software license in those states adopting revised
Article 1, but retaining the language of former section 1-105. The scope of revised
Article 1 is limited to transactions otherwise governed by U.C.C. § 1-102 (2001). A
forum court might therefore consider the parties’ choice of Maryland’s enactment of
the UCITA under the Restatement. If so, the parties would seem to have a reasonable
basis for their choice of Maryland’s enactment of the UCITA as a body of law written
expressly for software licensing, thus making the choice enforceable. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
239
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 745 (recognizing this precise point while
arguing against greater party autonomy).
240
See U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 2 (2001) (noting the consistency of revised section
1-301 and various international conventions governing choice of commercial law).
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However, some international conventions go even further than
section 1-301, and there is substantial support for the idea that others
should be expanded to allow the parties to choose any law—whether
241
or not adopted by any nation or state. Thus, while we argue in this
country over whether we should “modernize” our commercial choiceof-law provisions, as provided in section 1-301, many other countries
are debating the next step in party autonomy, or have already taken
it.
English choice-of-law would allow contracting parties to choose
English law in English courts, whether or not the transaction had any
242
connection with English law.
Commercial parties are ordinarily
free to choose governing law, even if unrelated to the transaction,
under Austrian, French, or Swiss law, subject only to mandatory law,
243
Indeed, party
such as consumer or employment contracts.
autonomy in choice of governing contract law is widely accepted
244
today in European law.
Even Chinese law grants broad autonomy
245
to parties to choose governing law in international transactions.
By contrast, party autonomy in choice of contract law has
246
The
progressed much more slowly in Latin American countries.
legal systems of most of those countries were derived from a
Portuguese and Spanish legal heritage based on authoritarian
247
Private choice-of-law was simply
notions of state sovereignty.
But see Woodward, supra note 32, at 746–49 (arguing that international choice-of-law
rules provide, at best, questionable support for broad party autonomy in domestic
choice of law rules).
241
See infra notes 255, 257.
242
Vita Food Prods. Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from N.S.) (Can.); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2 n.4. This,
essentially, allows the same result as the California, Delaware, Illinois or New York
statutes discussed supra Part IV. While the United States Supreme Court has not
spoken directly to this question, the Court provided a strong indication that it would
follow a similar approach. See generally M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972) (expressly deciding a choice-of-forum question, but effectively deciding
to apply English law in the absence of any relationship between the transaction and
England). While the reverse—application of unrelated foreign law in English
courts—is less clear, SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2 n.4, English law certainly
goes further in granting party autonomy than American domestic rules requiring a
reasonable relationship.
243
SCOLES, supra note 42, at § 18.2 & nn. 4, 5.
244
Lauro Da Gama E. Souza, Jr., The UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts and their Applicability in the Mercosur Countries, 36 REVUE JURIDIQUE
THEMIS 375, 385 (2002).
245
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.2 n.4. While China admittedly restricts party
autonomy in domestic transactions, this is hardly a model for American law.
246
Souza, supra note 244, at 385–86.
247
Id. at 382–86.
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antithetical to such legal doctrine, so Latin American law has been
248
quite slow to recognize the validity of law chosen by private parties.
Even where legal doctrine has evolved towards greater party
249
autonomy, courts have often remained resistant.
Nonetheless, out
of this same Latin American legal environment has come what is
arguably the most liberal of all international conventions in terms of
its respect for party autonomy in choice of governing commercial law.
The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts (the “Inter-American Convention”) was
drafted at a conference on private international law held in Mexico
City in 1994, which was attended by seventeen Latin American
250
countries, as well as the United States and Canada.
The InterAmerican Convention was signed by five Latin American countries
251
Article 7 states that the
and ratified by Mexico and Venezuela.
252
“contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.” This
unequivocal grant of party autonomy includes the right of the parties
to choose any body of law—even a-national or supranational law,
253
such as the UNIDROIT Principles.
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (the “Rome Convention”) is less clear. While the
language of Article 3(1) itself appears to grant complete party
254
autonomy in choice-of-law, most courts and scholars agree, based
248

Id. Notably, those same Latin American legal systems have been much slower
to embrace private dispute resolution through arbitration. Id. 387–96. This indeed
seems consistent with their reluctance to embrace private choice of substantive law.
The American divergence between our near complete embrace of arbitration,
compared to our hesitance in allowing broad choice-of-law, is much more difficult to
explain.
249
Id. at 382–96.
250
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts,
Mar. 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 733 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]; see also
Freidrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 382
(1994) [hereinafter Juenger, Inter-American Convention]. Professor Juenger served as
the advisor to the U.S. delegation. Id. at 381 n.a1.
251
Organization of American States, Department of Legal Affairs and Services,
Office of Inter-American Law and Programs, B-56: Inter-American Convention on
the Law Applicable to International Contracts, http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Sigs/b-56.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). The United States, however, has
never ratified or signed the Inter-American Convention. Id.
252
Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, art. 7.
253
See Juenger, Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, at 388; Juenger, Contract
Choice of Law, supra note 132, at 204–05. But see Souza, supra note 244, at 396–97
(arguing that this principle is not clear under the convention).
254
See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 3, June
19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 19 I.L.M. 1492 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
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on other language within the Rome Convention, that that choice is
255
While only a minority of
limited to the law of a country or state.
scholars believe that the Rome Convention, as currently drafted,
256
would allow for choice of a-national or supranational law, many
urge that the treaty be modified so as to unequivocally respect and
257
enforce such choices.
Both the Inter-American Convention and the Rome Convention
include exceptions to party autonomy based on certain mandatory
258
rules or fundamental public policies.
However, each embraces a
broad respect for party autonomy, generally, to choose governing
substantive law in commercial transactions—without any requirement
259
of a relationship between the transaction and the chosen law.
The incentive to allow greater autonomy under the Rome
Convention is particularly understandable, on one hand, in view of
260
the fact that the PECL is not the law of any individual country and is
not binding on EU members. At this time, proponents of this
attempt to promulgate a single European body of law (incorporating
elements of both civil and common law) believe that the best
opportunity to see its application realized may lie in express choice261
of-law provisions by parties to transactions.
However, such choices
would likely be unenforceable under the current Rome Convention.
One might argue that the circumstances of PECL are uniquely
European. However, when one considers the failures of the last

255

See Juenger, Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, at 383–84. Article 1(1)
of the Rome Convention states that its rules govern the “choice between the laws of
different countries,” and this wording represents a deliberate attempt to limit the
parties’ choice to positive law. Id.; see also Ana M. López-Rodríguez, The Revision of the
Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations—A Crucial Role
Within the European Contract Law Project?, 72 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 341 (2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/u
niversity_aarhus_en.pdf, at 8 (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
256
See Juenger, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 45, at 1145; see also López-Rodríguez,
supra note 255, at 8.
257
See, e.g., López-Rodríguez, supra note 255, at 9.
258
See Juenger, Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, at 383, 388. European
conflicts law, generally, as well as each of these conventions, distinguishes between
mandatory rules, which must be applied in the first instance, and fundamental public
policies, which chosen rules may not violate. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.4.
However, this distinction is not important for the purposes of this Article, and any
analysis of the distinction is, therefore, beyond its scope.
259
Indeed, broad party autonomy has triumphed generally in international
commercial law. NYGH, supra note 38, at 13–14.
260
See generally PECL, supra note 124.
261
See generally López-Rodríguez, supra note 255.
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decade to revise Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C., perhaps there is
merit in this notion of generating a body of private law to be adopted
by parties instead of legislatures. After all, it has been private bodies
263
The very
that have developed the U.C.C. in the first instance.
nature of our commercial law jurisprudence in this country ought to
make us more receptive than continental Europeans to private
choice-of-law. Much of the major opposition to allowing choice of anational or supranational law under the Treaty of Rome arises from
264
the notion of positive law as solely the province of the sovereign.
To the extent that law is positive, the notion of private lawmaking is
unacceptable. Thus, the argument goes, private law making should
be limited to, at most, private arbitration. However, our tradition of
commercial law making in this country is quite different.
The U.C.C. is largely the product of private law making and,
Llewellyn expressly intended that it focus on normative commercial
practices rather than positive statements by the sovereign as to what
265
Much of our common law and statutory
the law ought to be.
jurisprudence focuses on the normative nature of the “law
merchant.” Such normative law would seem to be much more
amenable to modification or substitution by the parties’ own
expressions of their chosen normative law. Thus, one could
reasonably argue that this country—and not Europe or Latin
America—ought to be leading the move to greater party autonomy in
266
choice-of-law, including a-national or supranational law.
In fact, the reasons for this country lagging behind in expanding
commercial party autonomy in choice-of-law likely have more to do
with parochialism and nationalism than any other factors. For most
of the past fifty years, the U.C.C. has provided a reasonably uniform
body of law governing interstate transactions in a country with the
luxury of focusing much more on transactions within its own borders
262

See generally Speidel, supra note 38 (discussing the various travails of the Article
2 revision process). While Amended Article 2 was completed in 2003, not a single
state legislature has adopted it.
263
See Rasmussen, supra note 95, at 1101; William J. Woodward, Jr., Private
Legislation in the United States—How the Uniform Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP.
L. REV. 451, 453 (1999).
264
See discussion and sources cited supra note 255.
265
See WILLIAM TWINNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 302–13
(1985).
266
For a discussion of the demise of legal positivism as it relates to choice of
governing commercial law, see Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship, supra note 132,
at 490–91. See also Juenger, Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, at 387–88
(suggesting that American limits on party autonomy, including those in U.C.C.
§ 1-105, are entirely out of step with modern trends allowing for greater autonomy).
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than most of the rest of the world. By limiting choice-of-law
alternatives, the U.C.C. effectively ensured that its provisions,
including those designed to protect parties in various circumstances,
267
However, with the relatively
would always be applied by courts.
recent expansion of both arbitration and international transactions
conducted by American businesses, both the wisdom and
effectiveness of this parochial approach is subject to question.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM MODEL LAW GOVERNING AN EXPRESS
CHOICE-OF-LAW BY THE PARTIES TO A CONTRACT
This final Part will address the need for uniformity in choice-oflaw, suggest reasonable limits on party autonomy, and propose a
model statute incorporating those limits. This Part will conclude by
discussing the constitutionality of such a statute under the Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.
A. The Need for Uniformity in Choice-of-Law
While various states have begun to grant parties expanded
autonomy in choice-of-law, the effort has arguably resulted in less,
rather than more, uniformity. The two attempts at uniform choiceof-law in contracts—UCITA and section 1-301 of the U.C.C.—have
268
met with little success.
While there are some discernable
similarities in various individual state choice-of-law enactments, there
is nothing even approximating uniformity. This lack of uniformity
presents a problem on at least two levels.
First, it encourages forum shopping based on the forum’s
conflicts law. “Any method of choice-of-law, unless uniformly applied
by all possible forums, will lead to forum shopping if plaintiff
267

Both legislatures and courts have proven to be quite hostile towards any law
that might displace the U.C.C.—presumably, because they think it is superior to
other law. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 116, § 1.5 (explaining the U.S. decision to
opt out of Article 1(1)(b) via an Article 95 reservation as based on the idea of
minimizing the displacement of the superior U.C.C. by the inferior CISG); Filanto v.
Chilewich, 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (suggesting that the U.S. should
not have agreed at all to the adoption of the CISG by referring to the efforts of the
federal government as an attempt to “fix something that was not broken”); Michael
Wallace Gordon, Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the CISG and
UNIDROIT Principles as Reflected in One State’s (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School
Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) Judges, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 361, 367 (1998) (noting the lack of knowledge of the applicability of the
CISG, generally, amongst the practicing bar and judiciary in Florida, as well as the
disinclination of the judiciary to apply any commercial sales law other than the
U.C.C.).
268
See discussion supra Parts I, II.B.
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269

attorneys are doing their jobs.”
Depending on whether its earlier
270
a party
express choice of substantive law still looks attractive,
commencing litigation may choose a forum that is more or less likely
271
to enforce its previous choice.
Of course, this sort of forum
shopping undermines the very predictability the parties sought in the
first place by expressly choosing the law governing their contract.
The parties can attempt to contract around this problem by
including a forum selection clause, along with their express choice-of272
law clause. Such choice-of-forum clauses are generally enforced.
273
and occasions of nonHowever, there are certainly limits
274
It may also be difficult to find agreement between
enforcement.
the parties on a single forum at the time of contracting. In short,
while a choice-of-forum clause may often be desirable, parties should
not be required to rely on forum restrictions in order to be sure a
court will enforce their choice of governing contract law. The better
answer is a uniform law on the issue.
Secondly, uniform law will help to promote comity between
jurisdictions in recognition of fundamental public policies of other
interested states that may be in conflict with the parties’ express

269

Russell J. Weintraub, Comments on the Roundtable Discussion of Choice of Law, 48
MERCER L. REV. 871, 881 (1997).
270
Of course, hindsight may provide a very different view of the preferred law
after a specific dispute has already arisen and the parties’ lawyers have evaluated the
potential claims and defenses.
271
A governing law clause selecting a law other than the law of the forum is
presumptively interpreted as choosing only substantive law governing the merits of
any dispute between the parties. Thus, the forum’s own conflict rules typically apply.
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.1. Parties generally avoid express choices of
conflicts rules in order to avoid the problem of “renvoi.” Marrella, supra note 129, at
1166–67.
272
See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1972) (enforcing
the parties’ freely negotiated forum selection clause).
273
See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 377 (1993)
(explaining that issues of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens remain);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971) (providing that
forum selection clauses are “given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable”).
The level of deference to party autonomy in choice of forum varies among
courts. On one end of the spectrum, a court may give near absolute deference to the
parties’ express choice of forum, whereas other courts may consider the parties’
choice as merely one element in a forum non conveniens analysis. Hannah L.
Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International Contract Litigation: The Role of Judicial
Discretion, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 185, 197–99 (2004).
274
See, e.g., Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 812–13 (Utah 1993)
(refusing to enforce a forum selection clause because it might have required a party
to litigate the same basic dispute against two parties in two separate forums).
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275

choice.
With the current domestic non-uniform approach to
choice-of-law, parties can avoid any given state’s conflicts law by
276
This promotes competition,
simply choosing a different forum.
rather than cooperation, between states. While competition is
healthy under many circumstances, here such competition directly
undermines the sovereignty of other states to legislate and enforce
277
certain fundamental public policies.
As a result, neither current
laws attempting to expand party autonomy, nor current laws trying to
restrict it, are consistently effective.
The best way to achieve consistent, predictable decisions with
respect to choice of governing contract law is through a uniform
statute. In order to achieve that result, such a statute should grant
broad party autonomy, while including reasonable limits on that
autonomy. Lastly, the statute should be applied by the forum court
with an appropriate level of comity for other interested jurisdictions,
inasmuch as the roles may be reversed on other occasions. This has
increasingly become the model under international commercial
278
law, and it makes a worthy model for domestic state law.
B. Reasonable Limits on Party Autonomy in Choice-of-Law
Commercial parties long ago learned that they could select their
own substantive law by choosing arbitration as their method of
dispute resolution. With the increasing deference to arbitration
under the Federal Arbitration Act, as consistently interpreted by
279
United States Supreme Court, it seems extremely unlikely that the
parties’ autonomy to choose their own law in arbitration will be
restricted beyond the existing public policy restriction. Trends both
domestically and internationally also show an unmistakable direction
in favor of greater party autonomy in choice of governing law in
court adjudication, thus providing commercial parties with numerous
opportunities to select judicial forums likely to give deference to the
parties’ chosen law—irrespective of whether the transaction bears any
relationship to the law chosen and perhaps irrespective of whether
that law has been adopted by any governmental body.
275

See discussion infra Part VI.B; Patchel, supra note 50, at 127–28.
See Woodward, supra note 32, at 776–77.
277
See infra Part VI.B.1.
278
See Buxbaum, supra note 273, at 186 (noting the increasing comity and
cooperation between various courts involved in international commercial litigation);
see also generally Louise Ellen Teitz, Parallel Proceedings and the Guiding Hand of Comity,
34 INT’L LAW. 545 (2000) (noting the trend towards greater comity in avoiding
parallel proceedings); see also discussion supra Part III.A.3.
279
See discussion and sources cited supra note 123.
276
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In the face of such a reality, it would seem counterproductive for
a state to attempt to protect its sovereign right to legislate for the
benefit of its citizens by refusing to follow this obvious trend allowing
280
for greater party autonomy. Instead, both state sovereignty and the
parties themselves are better protected by uniform choice-of-law
statutes, consistent with the modern trend, and including a few,
narrowly-tailored limits on party autonomy to choose governing law.
In considering such limits, I believe that the primary practical choiceof-law concerns can be broken down into two basic categories: (1) law
281
that is contrary to a mandatory law or fundamental public policy of
the jurisdiction whose substantive law would apply absent an express
choice-of-law provision; and (2) unfair surprise in subjecting a party
to a substantive body of law that it could not reasonably have
expected and to which it did not knowingly assent.
1.

Fundamental Public Policy

The first concern is one addressed in most modern choice of law
provisions—though absent (at least expressly) in former section 1-105
of the U.C.C. and a number of other domestic statutes governing
282
contractual choice-of-law.
The parties’ express choice of
substantive law will not be applied by a court where that choice is
contrary to a fundamental public policy of the jurisdiction whose law
283
This concern is also
would apply absent the express choice.
addressed in determining the enforceability of arbitration awards.
An award that is contrary to a relevant fundamental public policy may
284
285
be vacated or otherwise rendered unenforceable.
280

This seems to be precisely the advice suggested by opponents of the expanded
party autonomy represented by section 1-301 of the U.C.C. See Greenstein, supra
note 32, at 1177–78, 1182.
281
Interestingly, the UNIDROIT Principles anticipate and fully address the first
concern: Article 1.4 expressly acknowledges that mandatory rules of the relevant
jurisdiction will always take precedence over any contrary provision of the UNIDROIT
Principles. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 38, art. 1.4. The PECL have a similar
provision. PECL, supra note 124, art. 1:103, at 100. Thus, there is nothing in the
nature of a-national or supranational law that conflicts with any jurisdictions’
sovereign right to ensure that mandatory laws are applied to appropriate disputes.
282
See discussion supra Part IV.A. and note 204.
283
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 81.125 (2003); U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (2001); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971).
284
See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 34(2)(b)(ii) (1985). Generally, an award
may be vacated only in the jurisdiction in which it is rendered. See id. arts. 34(1),
34(2), 6 (together limiting an action to set aside an award to the national court(s)
designated in Article 6).
285
See, e.g., id. arts. 34(2)(b)(ii), 36(1)(b)(ii); Foreign Arbitral Awards
Convention, supra note 130, art. 5. A court may refuse to enforce an otherwise valid
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A notable exception to such public policy based limits on party
autonomy is contained in the Texas choice-of-law provision governing
286
transactions of $1,000,000 or more.
That statute provides, in
certain transactions, for the avoidance of any otherwise applicable
287
public policy —an approach that is inconsistent with the idea of
comity and the respect for state sovereignty that such comity
promotes.
A transaction will often include substantial and
inextricable ties to a particular jurisdiction, and, to the extent that
the chosen law is inconsistent with fundamental public policies of
that jurisdiction, any court or arbitral panel reviewing the transaction
should give due deference to such policies of the relevant
jurisdiction.
For example, one might consider a hypothetical transaction
based on the 1993 movie “Indecent Proposal.” In the movie, the
character played by Robert Redford contracts with the character
played by Demi Moore to pay her $1,000,000 in exchange for a night
of sex—in other words, they agree to a contract for prostitution.
Further assume that both parties are Texas citizens and contemplate
the performance of their agreement within that state.
Our contracting parties dutifully consult with counsel in drawing
up their agreement, as each wants to be certain of its enforceability in
a Texas court of law. The amount of the transaction would seemingly
288
make it a “Qualified Transaction” under Texas choice-of-law rules,
thus allowing the parties significantly greater autonomy in choosing a
289
The
foreign law that would countenance such an agreement.
parties recognize that this contract would likely violate a fundamental
290
public policy of the state relating to the validity of the transaction,
so the Texas courts will not enforce it unless it bears a reasonable
291
relationship to the chosen law.
However, the parties are able to
award if it is contrary to a fundamental public policy of the jurisdiction in which
enforcement is sought. See UNCITRAL Model Law art. 36(1)(b)(ii).
286
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(c) (Vernon 2003); see supra note 204 and
accompanying text.
287
Id. Professor Ribstein also advocates an approach that allows parties, in certain
circumstances, to avoid otherwise applicable fundamental public policy. See generally
Ribstein, supra note 91.
288
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.51(a)(2).
289
The parties would simply select the law of a jurisdiction that considers
prostitution legal.
290
Illegal contracts are void as a matter of public policy. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 5.1 (4th ed. 2004).
291
The parties’ transaction need not bear any relationship to the chosen law
under section 35.51(c) of the Texas Business and Commercial Code. TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 35.51(c). However, that subsection does not include issues of validity
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ensure that such a reasonable relationship exists under Texas law by
simply negotiating and signing their agreement within the
292
Having returned
jurisdiction whose laws the parties have chosen.
to Texas with their signed contract, either of the parties could
apparently enforce it in a Texas court—despite its clear illegality
under Texas law.
It is of course doubtful that any Texas court would actually
293
However, this scenario, as well as
enforce such an illegal contract.
many involving public policy violations much less far fetched, point to
the problem of granting broad party autonomy in choice-of-law
without an appropriately narrow exception where the parties’ choice
would violate certain fundamental public policies of a jurisdiction
with an appropriate connection to the transaction. Indeed, such an
exception is recognized even in arbitration.
If one agrees with the propriety of a court-applied, fundamental
public policy exception to party autonomy, there remain three
significant decisions in defining such an exception: (1) what kinds of
294
public policies are sufficiently fundamental to be given effect; (2)
how should a court decide whether a particular jurisdiction’s public
295
policies should be considered; and (3) should the public policies of
the forum be given effect, solely by virtue of its selection as the forum
296
A complete analysis and conclusion with
for dispute resolution?
respect to any of these three questions is beyond the scope of this
297
article. However, a few preliminary thoughts can be offered here.
First, the exception should be narrowly applied in order to
promote commercial certainty and avoid unnecessarily undermining

and does not expressly avoid any fundamental public policy exception. Thus, the
parties must look to subsection (b), which does avoid public policy issues—even if
they go to validity or enforceability—but requires a reasonable relationship between
the transaction and the chosen law. Id. § 35.51(b).
292
See id. § 35.51(d)(5).
293
Even though the letter of the Texas statute expressly overrides any Texas
public policy, id. § 35.51(b), I suspect that a court might find some creative basis to
avoid enforcement. Perhaps a Texas court might simply decline jurisdiction (as
opposed to accepting jurisdiction and failing to apply the parties’ chosen law) based
on public policy concerns. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90
(1971).
294
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.4(2).
295
See id., § 18.4(1).
296
See id.
297
I expect to address all of these questions in a follow up article focused
specifically on the appropriate scope and application of a fundamental public policy
exception to party autonomy in choice of governing contract law.
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298

party autonomy.
A statute might provide an express definition, as
in the Oregon statute explaining that “an established policy is
fundamental only if the policy reflects objectives or gives effect to
essential public or societal institutions beyond the allocation of rights
299
An alternative
and obligations of parties to a contract at issue.”
approach might avoid any detailed definition in the statute itself,
leaving the matter up to common law development and principles of
comity, but providing some degree of guidance by way of comments
300
and examples.
Second, a statute must answer the question of which
jurisdiction’s public policies might be relevant. In determining
whether a particular jurisdiction’s public policies should be
considered, the forum court might take a multilateral approach and
decide which body of law would apply to any particular issue in
301
question absent the parties’ choice, the lex causae.
Under this
approach, only public policies arising out of the lex causae would be
considered in determining whether any are contrary to the parties’
express choice. Alternatively, or additionally, a forum court might
302
focus on the likely place or places of enforcement of any judgment.
A third question is whether the forum, solely by virtue of its
choice as the forum, should consider its own public policies as a basis
303
to deviate from the parties’ chosen substantive law.
One might
298

Fundamental public policies sufficient to overcome party autonomy are likely
to arise most often in the context of employment or consumer contracts. An
appropriately narrow exception should rarely affect the parties’ choice in
commercial transactions that do not involve consumers. See, e.g., Michael S. Finch,
Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on the Restatement (Second),
24 STETSON L. REV. 653, 714 (1995) (suggesting that the public policy exception to
choice-of-law in contracts disputes “is usually invoked by individual as distinct from
corporate litigants”).
299
OR. REV. STAT. § 81.125(2) (2001); see also id. § 81.125(1)(a), (b) (precluding
enforcement of law that would require illegal conduct).
300
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (2001); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 187(2)(b) cmt. g (1971).
301
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.10. This is the approach taken under
both section 187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and revised
section 1-301 of the U.C.C.
302
This approach would be consistent with that applied in international
commercial arbitration. See discussion and sources cited supra note 130.
303
Neither the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, nor the revised section 1-301
of the U.C.C. expressly provide for such an exception. See U.C.C. § 1-301 (2001);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971). Under the
Restatement, a court will apply the policies of the forum, qua forum, only if they relate
to judicial administration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. e
(1971). However, a forum court may look to its own public policy as a basis to
decline jurisdiction. Id. § 90.
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argue that any fundamental public policy of the forum jurisdiction
should be disregarded where the parties have chosen their own
governing law. The rationale for this approach would be to
discourage forum shopping. If forum law can trump the parties’
chosen law, then parties will be encouraged to seek specific forums—
having determined on an ex post basis that such forums may have
favorable public policies—in which to litigate their claims. On the
other hand, a forum court might have other alternatives to
disregarding the parties’ express choice. A forum court could simply
decline jurisdiction if the parties’ choice of law was repugnant to a
304
fundamental public policy of the forum jurisdiction.
2.

Unfair Surprise

The second concern—that of unfair surprise—may arise to some
305
degree in all form contracts. However, this concern does not justify
blanket limitations on the parties’ right to choose substantive law.
Rather, the importance of the parties’ choice of law should be
recognized and statutory choice-of-law provisions should include
greater safeguards to ensure actual assent. For example, U.C.C.
Article 2 includes other provisions requiring that any party, to be
bound to certain promises contained in a form contract, must
306
Other provisions
separately sign the written provision in question.
provide express requirements for language and prominence before a
307
disclaimer will be enforced.
A combination of these two
approaches would likely provide a better, and more effective,
safeguard to ensure that choice-of-law provisions included in form
contracts are the products of actual assent. If a party cannot invoke
the choice-of-law provision without individually signing that
provision—a provision written in a sufficiently prominent and
straightforward manner—then it seems quite unlikely that a party

International conventions give consideration to a broader array of potential
sources of public policy sufficient to overcome the parties’ choice in a commercial
transaction. The Rome Convention considers, in various circumstances, the public
policies or mandatory rules of the lex causae, the forum, and other interested
jurisdictions with a “close connection” to the transaction. Rome Convention, supra
note 254, arts. 3(3), 7(1), 7(2). The Inter-American Convention gives effect to
public policies or mandatory rules of the forum, but seems to grant a tribunal broad
discretion in considering (or not) mandatory provisions of other states with “close
ties.” Inter-American Convention, supra note 250, arts. 11, 18.
304
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971).
305
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003).
306
See, e.g., id. § 2-205.
307
See, e.g., id. § 2-316.
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would be “unfairly” surprised by the substantive law applicable to the
308
transaction.
C. Model Statute on Party Autonomy in Choice of Contract Law
In suggesting a model choice-of-law statute, it seems appropriate
309
to address commercial contracts broadly, rather than limiting its
effect to those transactions within the scope of the U.C.C. Many
Code sections have their own specific choice-of-law provisions, and
any choice-of-law provision should respect those as exceptions
justified by the specific nature of the uniform laws at issue. However,
there seems little reason to address choice-of-law issues governing
310
sales of goods separate and apart from other commercial sales, such
as services and information. In fact, a uniform choice-of-law
provision with a scope broad enough to include all of these sales
transactions would seem particularly beneficial in dealing with mixed
311
transactions.
A broad choice-of-law statute is also consistent with the modern
trend favoring statutory provisions addressing choice of contract law
312
broadly. What follows is, therefore, a proposed model choice-of-law
statute, for enactment by American state legislatures, and fully in lieu
of any existing provisions of former section1-105 of the U.C.C. or
section1-301 of the revised U.C.C. These provisions would be a part
of an overall statutory title and chapter governing “the choice of law
applicable to any contract, or part of a contract, except as expressly
provided in this Chapter.”

308

In fact, one might argue that a similar approach should be taken to
agreements to arbitrate in form contracts. While such a discussion is beyond the
scope of this Article, it might be noted that the effects of choosing arbitration over
court adjudication are reasonably well known. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 128, at
5–9 (describing some of the pros and cons of each). A choice of governing law,
however, may give rise to a far more infinite variety of effects on the parties’
substantive contract rights. As such, when included in a form contract, the choice
should be enforced only with clear evidence of knowledge that it was being made.
Such a requirement of a signed writing should also avoid Professor Woodward’s
concern that a purported oral choice of governing law might avoid an otherwise
applicable statute of frauds requirement. See Woodward, supra note 32, at 772–73
n.328 (expressing the aforementioned concern).
309
This Article remains focused on non-consumer contracts. Depending on one’s
view of choice-of-law in consumer contracts, they could be exempted from its scope.
310
Domestic sales of goods are governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C., absent an
enforceable choice to the contrary. U.C.C. § 2-102.
311
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-104, -105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003).
312
See supra Parts IV, V.
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Express Choice of Law by the Parties
(1) Except as expressly provided in paragraph 2, 3, or 4 below, a
contract shall be governed by the law or laws expressly chosen by
the parties. Any such choice may extend to the entire contract or
to part of the contract.
(2) A choice-of-law provision contained in a form contract shall
not be effective unless:
(a) the choice-of-law provision is clear and conspicuous; and
(b) the choice-of-law provision is separately signed by any
party other than the party supplying the form.
(3) A choice of law by the parties shall not be effective to the
extent its application would contravene an established
fundamental public policy embodied in the law or laws that would
govern the dispute in the absence of an express choice by the
parties.
(4) To the extent that any of the following specify the choice-oflaw applicable to the contract, that provision governs, and
paragraph 1 does not.

....
The remainder of paragraph (4) would include, for example,
those transactions governed by very specific U.C.C. provisions and
addressed as exceptions under former section 1-105(2). It might also
include, for example, exclusions for consumer contracts and
313
employment contracts.
D. The Constitutionality of the Proposed Model Statute
Critics of expanded party autonomy under the New York choice314
315
of-law statute, the Texas choice-of-law statute, and, most recently,

313

This Article takes no position as to the propriety of such exclusions from a
general rule granting broad party autonomy. However, excellent examples can be
found in the Oregon choice-of-law statute. See OR. REV. STAT. § 81.105(3) (2003)
(employment contracts); id. § 81.105(4) (consumer contracts); see also id. § 81.105(2)
(excluding entirely local construction contracts, which are presumably heavily
regulated under local law such as building codes and licenses).
314
See Barry W. Rashkover, Note, Title 14, New York Choice of Law Rule for
Contractual Disputes: Avoiding the Unreasonable Results, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 227, 227–28
(1985) (arguing that New York’s conflict-of-law statute violates the Full Faith and
Credit Clause (citing N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (1984))).
315
See Kirt O’Neill, Note, Contractual Choice of Law: The Case for a New Determination
of Full Faith and Credit Limitations, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1021–22, 1040, 1048–50
(1993) (acknowledging the likely validity of section 35.51 of the Texas Business and
Commercial Code under the current articulation of the constitutional standards, but
arguing for a more rigorous formulation of the test under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause).

GRAVES FINAL.DOC

2005]

10/11/2005 9:33:37 PM

AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF COMMERCIAL LAW

115

316

section 1-301 of the U.C.C., have questioned the constitutionality of
each under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Inasmuch as the statute
proposed herein goes even further in expanding party autonomy
than the New York statute, section 1-301, or, in some ways, the Texas
statute, it seems prudent to address the constitutionality of the
proposed statute.
A forum court’s application of the parties’ choice of substantive
contract law may raise two potential constitutional questions: (1) does
317
the application of the chosen law violate the Due Process Clause;
and (2) does the application of the chosen law violate the Full Faith
318
319
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, the United
and Credit Clause?
States Supreme Court explained that the selection of a state’s
substantive law satisfied both constitutional concerns, as long as the
state in question had “a significant contact or significant aggregation
of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
320
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”
While Justice Stevens
suggested two separate analyses for due process and full faith and
321
credit, the majority effectively treated them as two sides of the same
322
coin.
In the case of an express choice of governing contract law by the
parties to the agreement, the due process component appears easily
satisfied by the express consent of each of the parties. Having each
expressly contracted for the application of the chosen law, it would
be hard to imagine the application of that law to be arbitrary or

316

See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1162 (suggesting that section 1-301 of the
revised U.C.C. violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
317
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
318
Id. art. IV, § 1.
319
449 U.S. 302 (1981).
320
Id. at 313 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, &
Blackmun, JJ.). While this quotation comes from the plurality opinion, the dissent
agreed with the plurality’s expression of the constitutional test, thus making this
articulation a majority holding of the Court. Id. at 332–33 (Powell, J., dissenting,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Hague).
321
Hague, 449 U.S. at 323, 326 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting a more
detailed analysis of competing state interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and limiting Due Process analysis to the question of whether the choice-of-law
decision was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair).
322
See id. at 308; see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 n.3 (1988)
(explaining that whether the choice-of-law analysis regarding the appropriate statute
of limitations took place under the Due Process or Full Faith and Credit Clause
mattered little, because each essentially covered the same ground).
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323

fundamentally unfair to either party.
This analysis would hold
equally true in cases in which a forum court was applying the law of
another state or country, or law not adopted by any state or country,
inasmuch as the analysis focuses solely on the parties’ choice. Thus,
it is not surprising that any challenges to the constitutionality of
greater party autonomy in choice-of-law attempt to focus on the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.
1.

A Forum Court’s Enforcement of the Parties’ Choice of
the Substantive Law of the Forum State

Both Professor Greenstein and Mr. Rashkover focus on the
324
constitutionality of a forum court’s application of its own law, so
this is a good starting point for the analysis. Mr. Rashkover suggests
that a forum state may never apply its own law without also
325
However, “[t]his
considering the possible interests of other states.
assertion ignores the Hague court’s sole reliance on the sufficiency of
the forum state’s interests and its emphatic repudiation of the
326
While Professor Greenstein does not
weighing-of-interests test.”
directly suggest a return to the rejected “weighing-of-interests” test,
his arguments ultimately seem to lead in the same direction as Mr.
Rashkover’s.
Professor Greenstein initially acknowledges Hague’s rejection of
any balancing of competing state interests, and further acknowledges
that, under Hague, a slight “state interest” is sufficient to apply a
327
state’s chosen law.
He then turns to Justice Stevens’s concurrence
in Hague to suggest that the parties’ choice of a particular state’s law
328
is not sufficient to satisfy Full Faith and Credit concerns. However,
Professor Greenstein’s reliance on Justice Stevens’s concurrence in
Hague appears somewhat overstated. While correctly noting that
329
Professor Greenstein does not
Hague was a plurality opinion,
appear to acknowledge that all of the Justices, except Stevens, agreed
323

Indeed, Professor Greenstein appears to agree with this point. Greenstein,
supra note 32, at 1173; see also O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1034–39 (explaining that
deference to the parties’ express intent would seem to satisfy any Due Process
concerns and, for that matter, any constitutional concerns under the unitary test
expressed in Hague).
324
See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1161, 1173–74; Rashkover, supra note 314, at
227–29 (1985).
325
Rashkover, supra note 314, at 244–46.
326
O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1043–44 (specifically addressing Mr. Rashkover’s
analysis).
327
See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1171–72.
328
Id. at 1172, 1174–75.
329
Id. at 1171.
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330

with the plurality’s legal standard.
Thus, it seems somewhat less
likely that this criticism by Justice Stevens will lead to a new
divergence in the Court’s analysis of the Due Process and Full Faith
331
Instead,
and Credit Clauses, as suggested by Professor Greenstein.
it seems more likely that the Court would apply the existing Hague
test to any forum court’s application of its own law and would hold
the parties’ express choice constitutional.
This portion of the analysis will focus on the New York choice-of332
law statute.
The motivation for the enactment of the New York
statute was “to enhance the status of New York as a leading [national
333
That state interest,
and international legal and] financial center.”
coupled with the parties’ own interest in enforcement of their
express contract terms, would seem to provide a sufficient
“aggregation of contacts . . . such that [the] choice of [New York] law
334
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair” under Hague.
Other
Supreme Court precedent also lends support to the constitutionality
of the New York statute. The parties’ choice of a state’s law was
deemed a significant contact for jurisdictional purposes in Burger
335
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the very significant interest in the world of commerce in enforcement
of express forum selection and choice-of-law provisions in
336
furtherance of predictability in commercial transactions. Thus, the
New York choice-of-law statute would easily satisfy the Hague test, as
currently articulated by the Court.
Professor Greenstein and Mr. Rashkover each suggest that New
York’s interest should not be deemed constitutionally significant;
however, neither is persuasive. Mr. Rashkover suggests that any
benefit to the state of New York is either illusory or insufficient to
337
satisfy the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
However, the focus in
330

See Hague, 449 U.S. at 313, 332–33; see also discussion supra note 320.
See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1172–73.
332
All four of the articles addressing this issue under Hague also discuss the New
York statute, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1) (McKinney 2001), so it seems a
reasonable subject of analysis. See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1165; O’Neill, supra
note 315, at 1043–44; Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a
Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 496 (1989); Rashkover, supra note 314,
at 227–28.
333
Friedler, supra note 332, at 497 (citing R. Tierney, memorandum in Support of
Assembly Bill 7307-A, at 2 (1983)).
334
Hague, 449 U.S. at 313; see also Friedler, supra note 332, at 502–03.
335
471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985).
336
See Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974); Friedler, supra note
332, at 498–99, 502–03 (discussing both Burger King and Scherk in this respect).
337
Rashkover, supra note 314, at 242–46.
331
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Hague is on the state’s interest and not the quantification of benefits
338
arising out of that interest. Professor Greenstein suggests that New
York’s interest is insufficient and attempts to support his assertion by
analogy to a couple’s choice of an unrelated state’s law to govern
339
However, a marriage contract is sui generis and
their marriage.
hardly provides a reasonable analogy to commercial agreements.
Moreover, Professor Greenstein’s marriage contract hypothetical
expressly assumes that the chosen state in question has “no interest in
340
regulating [the parties’] marriage.” This is directly contrary to New
York’s stated interest in resolving parties’ commercial disputes under
New York law.
Nonetheless, Professor Greenstein attempts to rely upon this
marriage hypothetical and Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Hague to
suggest that other interested states also have a constitutional interest
protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and that this other state
interest bars the application of New York law absent some reasonable
341
relationship between the transaction and the chosen New York law.
In essence, this is nothing more than the “weighing-of-interests” test
expressly repudiated by the Court in Hague. While a New York
court’s application of New York law is almost certainly constitutional
under the Hague standard, it may be worth briefly addressing
Professor Greenstein’s next argument that a fundamental public
policy exception is inadequate in protecting the interests of other
states—if such interests were to be deemed relevant to a Full Faith
342
and Credit analysis.

338

See Friedler, supra note 332, at 502; see also O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1043–44
(suggesting that New York’s interest is constitutionally sufficient under Hague,
notwithstanding Mr. Rashkover’s arguments to the contrary).
Mr. Rashkover also argues that the parties’ interest in certainty with respect to
governing contract law is insufficient, because the New York statute will not promote
certainty. Rashkover, supra note 314, at 243. However, that argument is
fundamentally flawed in that it relies upon uncertainty in respect for party autonomy
absent the statute, in effect proving the need for it. While Mr. Rashkover is correct
that the lack of a forum selection clause may reintroduce such uncertainty, this does
not undermine the value of a statute respecting party autonomy—it simply
reemphasizes the need for a uniform choice-of-law statute or a forum selection
clause.
339
See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1174–75.
340
Id. at 1175.
341
Id. at 1174–77.
342
While acknowledging that Hague does not mandate any deference to
fundamental public policies of other interested states, Professor Friedler
acknowledges the potential concern and then addresses it by suggesting that a New
York court might likely supplement the New York choice-of-law statute by reference
to the common law public policy exception. See Friedler, supra note 332, at 511–12.
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Here, Professor Greenstein shifts his analysis back to section
1-301 of the U.C.C. and acknowledges that the statute includes a
343
fundamental public policy exception. He then suggests that, where
a forum court’s only interest in applying its own law rests solely on
the parties’ choice, that forum court could never be relied upon to
ascertain the fundamental public policy of another interested state in
344
a matter that would satisfy the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The
argument simultaneously proves both too much and too little.
If the Full Faith and Credit Clause actually requires some sort of
weighing of state interests when evaluating the enforceability of the
parties’ choice of governing contract law, then this same sort of
weighing would likely be required if the parties chose the law of a
state to which the transaction bore a reasonable relationship. Even if
the transaction bore some relationship to the chosen law, another
state might have a far greater interest based on some fundamental
public policy of that other state. Thus, Professor Greenstein’s analysis
would render any application of the parties’ chosen law in the face of
a potential interest of another state to be unconstitutional under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.
In fact, the courts of one state are quite competent to evaluate
the fundamental public policy of another state. Both federal and
state courts often apply the law of another state, or even another
country, by reference to its constitution, statutes, and relevant
precedent, including circumstances involving significant public policy
issues. It is simply difficult to fathom a decision interpreting the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as requiring deference by a forum court to a
fundamental public policy of another state, but precluding the forum
court from deciding the issue.
2.

A Forum Court’s Enforcement of the Parties’ Choice of
the Substantive Law of Another State or a Choice of ANational Law

A somewhat different question arises when the parties’ choice of
governing contract law requires a forum court to apply the law of
Mr. O’Neill goes even further and suggests a proposed reformulation of the
Hague test that would require due deference to the interests of other states under a
public policy exception. See O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1047–50. Mr. O’Neill’s Note
provided a direct response to the Texas choice-of-law statute that expressly allowed
the parties to avoid fundamental public policies of other interested states under
certain circumstances. See discussion supra Part VI.B.1 (discussing that aspect of the
Texas statute).
343
See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1178.
344
Id. at 1179–81.
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another state or to apply a-national law. Obviously, the forum state
cannot assert an interest in the development of its substantive law, as
in the case of the New York statute. Instead, its interest must rest
entirely on the application of its own choice-of-law provisions to the
disputes before its courts. Thus, a statute allowing the parties to
choose unrelated law, including a body of law other than that of the
345
forum, might require an additional level of constitutional analysis.
I am not aware of any prior constitutional analysis of this specific
346
issue, so I will attempt to provide both a simple approach and a
somewhat more complex approach.
One might simply focus on the choice-of-law statute rather than
347
the chosen governing law—particularly if a-national law is chosen.
If so, then the constitutional analysis is relatively straightforward. A
choice-of-law rule would quite likely be deemed a procedural rather
than a substantive rule for purposes of any Full Faith and Credit
348
The parties’ choice of governing substantive law is
analysis.
generally presumed to exclude the choice-of-law rules of the
349
jurisdiction chosen.
Instead, the forum, qua forum, employs its
own choice-of-law rules as a procedural rule of the forum, irrespective
of what substantive rule is ultimately chosen to govern the parties’
350
A state is always competent to legislate its own procedural
dispute.
rules and is never compelled by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
351
Thus, a choice-ofsubstitute the procedural rules of another state.
345

This would include, to varying degrees, the Oregon and Louisiana statutes, see
supra notes 207, 212, section 1-301 of the U.C.C., and the proposed model statute.
346
While the issue is clearly raised by section 1-301 of the U.C.C., Professor
Greenstein seems to have, inexplicably, focused entirely on a forum court’s
application of its own law. See Greenstein, supra note 32, at 1161, 1173–74.
347
Presumably, no state would have any interest in the application of such
a-national law.
348
While a state’s choice-of-law rules are considered substantive under an Erie
analysis, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (citing Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)), there is no relationship between the
substantive/procedural dichotomy under Erie and the substantive/procedural
dichotomy under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S.
717, 726–27 (1988).
349
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 26, § 18.1.
350
Id. § 3.1.
351
Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 722. Moreover, the Report accompanying the legislative
introduction of the Oregon statute contains a thorough discussion of both the
impetus and objectives of the new statute. See generally Nafziger, supra note 214.
After discussing the pre-existing unsatisfactory state of then-existing conflicts law in
Oregon, the Report expressly specifies the objectives of the statute “to establish
concrete, stable rules to resolve issues transcending jurisdictional boundaries.” Id. at
407. The Report further explains that “[t]he proposed bill manifests the objectives
of conflicts justice and material or substantive justice by setting for both a detailed set

GRAVES FINAL.DOC

2005]

10/11/2005 9:33:37 PM

AUTONOMY IN CHOICE OF COMMERCIAL LAW

121

law rule granting broad party autonomy should, itself, easily satisfy
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The more challenging issue arises if we attempt to evaluate the
352
constitutionality of the application of the chosen law. Suppose, for
example, that the parties chose the law of a jurisdiction without any
relationship to their transaction and without any expressed state
interest in parties choosing its law to govern their transactions. Or,
suppose the parties’ chose a-national law, such as the UNIDROIT
Principles. In either case, one might reasonably argue that no state
has any interest in the application of the chosen law to the parties’
transaction, and that even the minimal Hague test requires some state
353
However, there are two different
interest, however minimal.
approaches one might take in arguing that the application of such
unrelated law nevertheless satisfies any Full Faith and Credit
concerns.
First, one might argue that the Hague test is sufficiently unitary
that the parties express choice is, by itself, a sufficient interest to
satisfy any constitutional concerns—either Due Process or Full Faith
354
355
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
the Court’s
and Credit.
determination that the application of Kansas law to certain out-ofstate gas interests was unconstitutional rested largely on its
determination that “the parties had [no] idea that Kansas law would
356
control” at the time of contracting. After stating the Hague test, the
Court observed that “[w]hen considering fairness in this context, an
357
Thus, the
important element is the expectation of the parties.”
358
parties’ express choice might, by itself, satisfy both Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit under a truly unitary test.
If, however, the Court were to determine that Full Faith and
Credit required some state interest, notwithstanding express party
of rules and a general rule that requires the application of the best available or most
appropriate law, as defined by criteria of substantive justice.” Id. at 408. It would
seem beyond dispute that such a state interest would satisfy any constitutional
concerns.
352
It is not entirely clear to me that the Court would necessarily separate its
analysis of the operation of the relevant choice-of-law rule and the application of the
chosen substantive law. However, in view of the novelty of the issue, I thought it
worth a brief discussion.
353
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
354
See O’Neill, supra note 315, at 1040–42.
355
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
356
Id. at 822.
357
Id.
358
As discussed supra note 323, there would not appear to be any due process
concerns where the parties’ expressly chose the substantive law in question.
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consent to the substantive law in question, then it might reasonably
consider an approach similar to that advocated by Justice Brennan’s
359
In Wortman, the Court
concurrence in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.
considered the constitutionality of the application by a Kansas court
of its own statute of limitations to a claim governed by the substantive
360
A majority of the Court held the Kansas
law of another state.
court’s actions constitutional by determining that the Kansas statute
of limitations was a procedural, rather than substantive, rule for
361
However, Justice Brennan suggested that
purposes of this analysis.
a statute of limitations had both procedural and substantive aspects
362
and should be treated as such in any Full Faith and Credit analysis.
Like a statute of limitations provision, a choice-of-law provision
arguably has both procedural and substantive elements—particularly
when one looks at it in combination with the substantive law chosen.
Together, the choice-of-law provision and the chosen substantive law
will determine the parties’ contractual rights and obligations. As
such, it might be reasonable to evaluate them together under Full
Faith and Credit, which in turn might lead to a consideration of a
forum state’s interest in enacting its choice-of-law provision, as well as
its aggregation of contacts with the parties.
In effect, the parties are choosing the forum to resolve their
dispute. Whether this choice is made in the agreement itself or after
a dispute arises, the parties are, among other things, choosing the
forum’s choice-of-law rules. In adopting a law granting parties broad
autonomy in choosing governing contract law, a state is exercising a
legitimate interest in promoting itself as a center for resolution of
commercial disputes by promising to respect the parties’ choice of
governing law in an effort to add predictability and certainty to their
363
transactions.
Each party has an important self interest, and each
party’s interest is inextricably bound to the other’s. As such, the
forum’s application of the parties’ chosen law—even where it is not

359

486 U.S. at 734–43 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting a different analytical
approach to the Full Faith and Credit analysis of the application of the Kansas statute
of limitations in question).
360
Id. at 722–23.
361
Id. at 727–30.
362
Id. at 736 (Brennan, J., concurring).
363
The Report accompanying the legislative introduction of Oregon’s contractual
choice-of-law statute concludes by stating that “[e]nactment of the proposed
legislation would revive Oregon’s leadership in conflicts law . . . and would help put
Oregon in the forefront of a trend toward codification of conflicts law.” Nafziger,
supra note 214, at 413, Annex I.
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the law of the forum—should pass Constitutional muster under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the proposed model statute would allow our
hypothetical North Dakota seller of farm products to make a business
decision to choose the law most suitable to the seller and its buyers,
without regard to whether any given transaction bears any
relationship to the chosen law, and without regard to whether the
chosen law had ever been adopted by a sovereign state or country.
Such a choice by the parties would stand on equal footing with
choices made in arbitration and with modern trends in choice-of-law
applied by foreign and international courts. The parties’ choice
would be enforced, subject only to minimal requirements relating to
form contracts and a narrow exception where such choice would
contravene certain mandatory rules or violate certain fundamental
public policies.

